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The U.S. Supreme Court—thanks to various statutes passed by Congress 
beginning in 1891 and culminating in 1988—currently enjoys nearly unfet-
tered discretion to set its docket using the writ of certiorari.  Over the past few 
decades, concerns have mounted that the Court has been taking the wrong mix 
of cases, hearing too few cases, and relying too heavily on law clerks in the cer-
tiorari process.  Scholars, in turn, have proposed fairly sweeping reforms, such 




Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Associate Professor 
of Law, University of Washington School of Law.  Thanks to Ron Collins, Shon Hop-
wood, Maggie Lemos, Tom Merrill, Peter Nicolas, Rafael Pardo, Liz Porter, Richard 
Seamon, Andy Siegel, Joe Thai, and Amy Wildermuth for helpful comments on prior 
drafts, and to participants in faculty workshops at the University of Washington and 
Florida State University.  Also, thanks to Matthew King, Caitlin Imaki, Heather Griffith, 
and Erin Adam as well as the staff in the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library for ex-
cellent research assistance.  In addition, I am grateful to Justice John Paul Stevens as it 
was my clerkship with him that initially sparked my interest in certiorari. 
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
2 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1 
ticle argues that before the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is taken 
away, another area of the law—one that already has thought long and hard 
about how to constrain delegated discretion—should be consulted:  administra-
tive law.  Although certiorari and administrative law certainly differ, both in-
volve congressional delegations of discretion to a less accountable body and 
therefore both raise concerns of accountability, transparency, and reasoned deci-
sionmaking.  Accordingly, in considering certiorari reform, it makes sense to 
borrow from some of administrative law’s well-developed lessons about how de-
legated discretion can be controlled.  Specifically, after consulting the nondele-
gation doctrine, reason-giving requirements, public participation mechanisms, 
and oversight principles found in administrative law, this Article concludes 
that vote-disclosure requirements and increased public participation stand as 
promising ways of checking the Court’s currently unconstrained discretion. 
 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 3 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CERTIORARI ...................................................... 7 
A. The Court’s Beginnings as a Court of 
Mandatory Jurisdiction ............................................................ 8 
B. From Obligatory to Discretionary Jurisdiction ........................... 10 
C. Current Certiorari Practices .................................................... 14 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANALOGY TO 
CERTIORARI REFORM ...................................................................... 18 
A. Criticisms of Certiorari and Proposals for Reform ..................... 19 
B. Administrative Law as an Untapped Resource for Reform ........ 21 
III. CHECKS ON CERTIORARI VS. CHECKS ON  
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ............................................................ 25 
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine .................................................... 26 
1. Statutory Text ........................................................... 28 
2. Legislative History .................................................... 29 
3. Supreme Court Rule 10 ........................................... 32 
B. Softer Mechanisms for Control................................................. 33 
1. Political Accountability and Oversight .................... 34 
2. Public Participation ................................................. 36 
3. Judicial Review ......................................................... 38 
4. Reason Giving .......................................................... 39 
IV. CHECKING THE COURT’S DISCRETION:  SOME POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES ................ 42 
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
2011] Constraining Certiorari 3 
A. Legislating More Specific Standards ........................................ 43 
B. Mandating Disclosure to Enable Greater 
Transparency and Monitoring ............................................... 46 
1. Imposing a Reason-Giving Requirement ................ 47 
2. Requiring Disclosure of Certiorari Votes ................ 55 
a. Votes on Petitions That Fail to Make 
 the Discuss List ................................................. 57 
b. Votes on All Petitions or All Denied Petitions ...... 59 
C. Enabling Greater Public Participation ..................................... 62 
1. Invited Amici Briefs ................................................. 63 
2. Uninvited Amici Briefs............................................. 64 
3. Certification ............................................................. 67 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 68 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court today enjoys nearly unfettered discretion 
to choose which cases to hear via the discretionary writ of certiorari.1  
Various statutes enacted by Congress from 1891 to 1988 almost entire-
ly eliminated the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction and delegated to the 
Court the task of setting its agenda.  Thanks to these changes, the 
Court no longer operates in a world where the Court, in the words of 
Chief Justice John Marshall, had “no more right to decline the exer-
cise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not giv-
en.”2  Rather, the Court today enjoys broad discretion to decide which 
cases warrant the Court’s time, routinely granting certiorari in only 
about one percent of all petitions received each term.3
 
1
Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:  Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2000) (“[W]e have grown accus-
tomed to the idea that the Supreme Court sets its own agenda, and tend to take it for 
granted.” (footnote omitted)). 
 
2
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).   
3
See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 321 (9th ed. 2007) 
(“During the nine terms from 1992 to 2002, the Court granted 1.19 percent of the cer-
tiorari petitions filed.”); see also The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 382, 389 (2009) (noting that the Court granted review in 87 cases on the 
Court’s appellate docket out of 7868 total petitions, leading to a 1.1% grant rate); The 
Supreme Court, 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 523 (2008) (noting that 
the Court granted review in 95 cases on the Court’s appellate docket out of 8374 total 
petitions, also leading to a 1.1% grant rate).  If only paid petitions are considered, the 
grant rate goes up, whereas if only in forma pauperis petitions are considered, the 
grant rate goes down.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra, at 
389 (noting that 4.7% of paid petitions were granted, compared to only 0.1% of in 
forma pauperis petitions).    
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In choosing which cases will win a prized slot on the docket, the 
Court operates outside of the public eye and under a cloak of secrecy.  
The Court, for example, generally does not explain why a particular 
case will or will not be heard.4  Nor does the Court routinely disclose 
individual Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions.5  In addition, the 
Court makes its certiorari decisions free of any constraining legislative 
criteria that might differentiate those cases that merit certiorari from 
those that do not.6
In light of the sweeping discretion that the Court enjoys and the 
importance of the Court’s docket-setting powers,
 
7 it is not at all sur-
prising that certiorari has been criticized.  For example, Sanford Le-
vinson recently commented that “there are overtones—given the ex-
tent of discretion enjoyed by the Court—of southern sheriffs during 
the 1960s in having the authority to allow (or disallow) parades or 
demonstrations based on broad, unhelpful ‘standards’ and, ultimately, 
on what occasionally seems to be whim.”8  Edward Hartnett has ques-
tioned whether the Court’s broad discretion to set its own agenda can 
be squared with “classic conceptions of judicial review, judicial power, 
and the rule of law.”9
 
4
See infra notes 
  In addition, two scholars of the Court have 
noted that “[t]he most striking feature of the [certiorari] process is 
that it lacks most of the trappings of traditional judicial decisionmak-
88-91 and accompanying text.   
5
See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.   
6
See infra subsections III.A.1-2.   
7
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 
473, 482 (1973) (“[T]he screening function is inextricably linked to the fulfillment of 
the Court’s essential duties and is vital to the effective performance of the Court’s 
unique mission ‘to define [and vindicate] the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to 
assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of 
powers in our federal union.’” (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY 
GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 
578 (1972) [hereinafter FREUND REPORT])); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard 
Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:  Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case 
Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 397 (2004) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy 
of Certiorari] (“Given the many levels on which the Court’s case-selection decisions im-
pact its work, its role, and its image, decisionmaking at the threshold stage may be 
second to none in importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Margaret Meri-
wether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection:  The Relation-
ship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Cordray & 
Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection] (noting that certiorari is “[o]ne of the 
most critical aspects of the Supreme Court’s work”).   
8
Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload:  A Question of Law 
or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 101 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/02/ 
01/levinson.html. 
9
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1647.   
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ing—collegial deliberation, constraining criteria, majority rule, and 
public accountability.”10
What is surprising, however, is that scholars who have criticized 
certiorari and considered possible means of reform generally have fo-
cused on forcing the Court to hear certain kinds of cases or to hear 
more cases,
 
11 or alternatively on taking discretion away from the Court 
and giving it to some other body like a certiorari division.12  Accor-
dingly, scholars generally have not focused on the source of the Court’s 
discretion (namely, delegations from Congress) and how that dele-
gated discretion might be cabined or checked.  In particular, scholars 
have failed to look to the lessons of another area of the law that has 
already thought long and hard about how to control delegated discre-
tion:  administrative law.13  That is what this Article aims to do.  Al-
though administrative law might at first blush appear to be an uncon-
ventional place to look for ideas about how to reform certiorari,14
 
10
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 
 this 
7, at 398. 
11
See, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda:  Is There a Place for 
Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 1310 (2010) (noting that complaints about 
the Court’s certiorari practices “tend to reduce to two general assertions:  first, the 
Court is taking too few cases; and second, the Court is not taking the ‘right’ cases”); 
Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 89 (2009), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/24/lazarus.html (arguing that “the Court’s ple-
nary docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of expert Supreme Court advo-
cates” and suggesting that “[i]t is, accordingly, not the number of cases on the plenary 
docket but rather their content that is the real problem”); see also infra notes 101-02 
and accompanying text (identifying criticisms of the Court’s shrinking docket).   
12
See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:  Re-
viving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 591 (2009) (pro-
posing “to assign veteran circuit judges to replace some of the young law clerks and to 
empower those judges to independently designate a substantial, fixed number of cases 
that the Justices would be obliged to decide each year”).  In the 1970s, proposals were 
made to create a national court of appeals to take over portions of the Court’s certi-
orari cases.  See FREUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 590 (“We recommend creation of a 
National Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review now filed in the 
Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many cases of conflicts between 
circuits.”).  
13
For a discussion of the few examples of scholarship that briefly reference or dis-
cuss administrative law principles when thinking about the Court’s certiorari jurisdic-
tion, see infra note 98.   
14
In contrast to the general lack of scholarship connecting administrative law 
principles and certiorari, a few scholars have connected administrative law principles 
and judicial decisionmaking on the merits.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:  PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40-42 
(2009) (drawing on administrative law principles in arguing that courts must engage in 
reasoned decisionmaking on the merits); Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, 
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 1002 (2009) (arguing 
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Article argues that both certiorari and administrative law involve the 
same underlying concerns of accountability and reasoned decision-
making that arise when Congress—a deliberative and democratically 
accountable branch—delegates broad discretion to a less accountable 
body. 
The aim here is not to argue that the nondelegation doctrine, 
which limits Congress’s ability to delegate lawmaking power, strictly 
governs in the certiorari context—although there are persuasive ar-
guments that the doctrine might apply to certiorari that warrant fur-
ther exploration.15
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an overview 
of certiorari.  Part II argues that administrative law’s lessons warrant 
consideration in the certiorari context because both certiorari and 
administrative law involve broad congressional delegations of policy-
making discretion to a less accountable body and hence both raise 
similar concerns about accountability, transparency, and reasoned 
decisionmaking. 
  Rather, the contention is that, even if the nondel-
egation doctrine does not control certiorari as a constitutional matter, 
the same principles that underlie the doctrine—that important policy 
decisions should be made in a transparent, accountable, and prin-
cipled manner—represent sound policy that the Court and Congress 
should take into account in considering reforms to certiorari. 
Part III looks at well-developed principles and mechanisms that 
operate in the administrative law world to constrain discretion—
 
that federal courts should subject judicial opinions on the merits to a notice-and-
comment system).  
15
Arguments that the nondelegation doctrine should apply to certiorari might 
not start with Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which serves as the font of 
the traditional nondelegation doctrine.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).  Rather, 
one might start with Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that 
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over specified cases “with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”  Id. art. III, § 2 (em-
phasis added).  In light of this text, the Framers seem to have quite expressly chosen to 
give Congress rather than the Court the power to make “exceptions” to the Court’s ju-
risdiction and to promulgate “regulations” governing the Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion.  Hence, it might be argued that Congress—by delegating docket-setting powers to 
the Court without providing a constraining standard—has violated nondelegation 
principles.  Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 127 (1962) (noting that “Congress has granted the ju-
risdiction” but that “[i]t is the Supreme Court that makes the exceptions, and it does 
so by the case, not by the category; and that is what happens, even though the excep-
tions are the cases that are heard rather than those that are dismissed”).  This Article, 
however, does not resolve this constitutional question. 
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namely, the nondelegation doctrine, political oversight, public partic-
ipation, judicial review, and reason-giving requirements.  Part III con-
cludes that the Court’s discretion in the certiorari context is not 
checked by similar principles.  When Congress gave the Court the 
power to pick its cases, for example, Congress did not include any 
guiding statutory principle, such as a directive that the Court grant 
certiorari where doing so would serve the “public interest,” as the 
nondelegation doctrine would require in the administrative context.16
Finally, Part IV borrows from administrative law’s lessons and con-
siders three possible means of certiorari reform aimed at increasing 
accountability, transparency, and participation:  (1) legislating more 
meaningful standards to provide an intelligible principle to guide cer-
tiorari; (2) providing reasons for certiorari denials or, at a minimum, 
disclosing Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions; and (3) increasing the 
opportunity for public participation in the certiorari process.  Part IV 
concludes that a vote-disclosure requirement and increased opportun-
ities for public participation, which could be achieved through greater 
use of invited and uninvited amicus curiae briefs as well as a revival of 
certification, offer the most promising means of constraining the 
Court’s discretion and enabling greater transparency, deliberation, 
and monitoring in the certiorari process. 
  
Nor are the Court’s certiorari decisions constrained by any of the oth-
er mechanisms that play a constraining role in administrative law, 
such as reason-giving requirements, judicial review, or meaningful po-
litical oversight. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CERTIORARI 
At its inception, the Court’s jurisdiction was not discretionary.  Ra-
ther, the Court initially stood as a court of obligatory jurisdiction that 
felt it had “no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which 
is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”17  It was only through 
the passage of various laws beginning in 1891 that Congress, respond-
ing primarily to functional concerns about the Court’s workload, 
transformed the Court from a court with “an entirely mandatory 
docket” to a court with an “overwhelmingly discretionary one.”18
 
16
See infra notes 
  This 
Part describes that transformation. 
134 -40 and accompanying text.   
17
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).   
18
Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure:  An Exami-
nation of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 2 (2003); see also RICHARD H. FAL-
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A.  The Court’s Beginnings as a Court of Mandatory Jurisdiction 
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides for “one su-
preme Court” and empowers Congress to create inferior federal 
courts.19  Article III, Section 2 then defines the judicial power, explain-
ing that the Court shall have “original Jurisdiction” in all cases “affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party.”20  Article III, Section 2 further provides 
that the Court shall have “appellate Jurisdiction” in all other “Cases” 
and “Controversies” mentioned in Article III, “with such Exceptions, 
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”21  Hence, as the 
leading Supreme Court treatise has put it, the constitutional descrip-
tion of appellate jurisdiction makes clear that “it is Congress, not the 
Constitution or the Supreme Court, that defines the precise metes 
and bounds of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the specified 
‘cases and controversies.’”22
When Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it created two 
types of inferior federal courts:  thirteen district courts, as well as three 
multidistrict circuit courts that consisted of two Supreme Court Justic-
es and a district judge from within the circuit.
 
23  Both the district and 
the circuit courts generally operated as trial courts in the first in-
stance, with the circuit courts enjoying only a very “limited appellate 
jurisdiction over the district courts.”24
 
LON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
30 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that the “principle of discretionary review” was introduced 
by the Evarts Act (citing Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006)))).   
 
19
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.   
20
Id. § 2.   
21
Id. (emphasis added).     
22
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 72-73; see also DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SE-
LECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 9-10 (1980) (“Under the Constitu-
tion, Congress has the responsibility to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the 
United States Supreme Court.”). 
23
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75 (creating the thirteen 
district courts and the Eastern, Middle, and Southern circuits); see also FELIX FRANK-
FURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 11 (Transaction 
Publishers 2007) (1928) (describing the Judiciary Act of 1789).   
24
Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1230 
(1979); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 21–22, 1 Stat. at 83-84 (providing appellate ju-
risdiction to the circuit courts in limited circumstances); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra 
note 23, at 12-13 (noting that the volume of appellate business does not appear to have 
been very considerable).   
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Congress initially gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 
over certain classes of cases coming up from the lower federal courts25 
and the state courts.26  These appeals were appeals as of right—
meaning that the Court was obligated to hear the appeal when the 
case fell within the Court’s congressionally defined appellate jurisdic-
tion.27  The Court “had no power to pick and choose which cases to 
decide.”28
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did empower the federal courts to issue 
various common law writs, including the writ of certiorari,
 
29 which has 
its roots as an English prerogative writ.30  However, the Judiciary Act 
did not authorize the Court to use the writ as a means of enabling dis-
cretionary jurisdiction.31  Rather, the Judiciary Act enabled the Court 
to use the writ of certiorari as “an auxiliary process only, to supply im-
perfections in the record of a case already before it.”32
 
25
See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81 (providing for “appellate jurisdic-
tion from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after 
specifically provided for”); id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84 -85 (delineating the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over the district courts).  
  Accordingly, 
during the first one hundred years of its existence, “the Court was ob-
26
See id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87 (limiting the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state 
court cases to those involving state constitutions in which the validity of those laws is 
questioned as being “repugnant” to federal laws); see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1231 
(“[A] litigant had a right to Supreme Court review of most federal noncriminal litiga-
tion and of a more limited number of state court decisions.”).   
27
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1649 (noting that “the Supreme Court was re-
quired to decide those cases within its congressionally-defined jurisdiction”).  
28
Id.     
29
See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (enabling federal courts to issue 
all writs “necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to 
the principles and usages of law”).   
30
See generally Frank J. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 493, 493 
(1891) (describing how the writ of certiorari, like most of the English writs, “was origi-
nally a prerogative writ”); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Preroga-
tive Writ:  Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y. L.F. 478, 504 (1963) (noting that the early 
writ of certiorari “was technical nomenclature denoting that certain records or docu-
ments were certified and transmitted at the request of the Crown” and explaining that 
“[i]n the late Tudor period, certiorari still retained its narrow, mechanical function 
and was widely used in criminal proceedings, to bring up records on appeal and to se-
cure certification of official acts”). 
31
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650 (“Such certiorari did not provide the Su-
preme Court with discretionary control over its jurisdiction.”).   
32
Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 380 
(1893); see also United States v. Dickinson, 213 U.S. 92, 102 (1909) (explaining that the 
writ was used more frequently in England than in the United States); In re Chetwood, 
165 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1897) (recognizing the limitations in American Construction, but 
also noting that the writ may be used “to correct excesses of jurisdiction and in fur-
therance of justice”); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650 (describing the history of the writ). 
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liged to decide every case that properly came before it, whether by way 
of an appeal or a writ of error.”33
B.  From Obligatory to Discretionary Jurisdiction 
 
As the country grew in scale and complexity in the wake of the 
Civil War,34 the Court’s docket grew “dramatically,”35 increasing from 
253 cases pending in 1850 to 1,816 cases pending at the beginning of 
the 1890 October Term.36  Although the Court was obligated to hear 
this expanding docket of cases, the reality was that it simply could not 
keep up with its mushrooming docket, leading to a “growing backlog 
of delayed cases.”37  By 1890, the Court’s docket was so congested that 
“it took three and a half years between the time a case was first dock-
eted in the Supreme Court and the time it was orally argued before 
the justices.”38
Congress initially responded to the Court’s workload problems 
through various “piecemeal and dilatory” solutions,
 
39 such as by reduc-
ing the Justices’ circuit-riding duties40 and restricting the Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction.41  However, in 1891, Congress took a stronger 




GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 
  It was in the Evarts Act that Congress first introduced the 
statutory writ of certiorari as a mechanism to enable discretionary re-
3, at 74; see also Buchman, supra note 18, at 2. 
34
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 56 -59 (describing how the post-
Civil War period “brought with it an accelerated industrial development” and other 
political, social and economic forces that led to an increase in the business of the fed-
eral courts). 
35
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 28 
(“Growth in the Supreme Court’s caseload resulted both from an increased population 
and from congressional additions to the Court’s jurisdiction, including civil rights, ha-
beas corpus, and patent and copyright cases.” (footnotes omitted)).   
36
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 60. 
37
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650. 
38
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 236 (2001). 
39
PROVINE, supra note 22, at 10.   
40
See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, §§ 2–4, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45 (laying out the respon-
sibilities of a circuit judge); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 30 (not-
ing that the 1869 Act “drastically curtailed circuit riding”).       
41
See Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 315, 316 (raising the jurisdictional 
amount in controversy to $5000).   
42
The Evarts Act is also known as the Circuit Court of Appeals Act.  See Act of Mar. 
3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (creating a court of appeals in each circuit and 
requiring the appointment of three circuit judges to each court). 
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view and docket control43—planting the early seeds for what was later 
to become the Court’s almost entirely discretionary docket.44
In the Evarts Act, Congress generally continued the longstanding 
notion of appeals as of right and obligatory jurisdiction.
 
45  For exam-
ple, cases from the district courts or existing circuit courts that in-
volved the construction or application of the U.S. Constitution were 
still appealable as of right, as were cases involving the conviction of a 
“capital or otherwise infamous crime.”46  Congress, however, also 
made circuit court of appeals decisions “final” in certain limited 
classes of cases, such as in diversity litigation and in suits under the 
revenue and patent laws.47  Congress enabled Supreme Court review of 
these limited classes of “final” decisions only if:  (1) the court of ap-
peals certified any questions or propositions of law from the case to 
the Court; or (2) the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to 
bring the judgment before it for review.48  In this way, Congress “be-
gan to invest the Court with a bit of discretion in deciding which cases 
should be given plenary consideration.”49
As Hartnett has described, “certiorari was envisioned as a sort of 
fallback provision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occa-






See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (allowing the Supreme Court, by certiorari, to review 
any cases final in the courts of appeals).  
  The Court’s early use of certiorari confirms this vision of a 
44
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 30 (noting that it was through the innova-
tion of the Evarts Act that “the then revolutionary, but now familiar, principle of dis-
cretionary review of federal judgments on writ of certiorari” was born); REYNOLDS RO-
BERTSON & FRANCIS R. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 310, at 589 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland eds., Matthew Bender & 
Co. 1951) (1936) (“The use of certiorari as an ordinary appellate process had its incep-
tion in section 6 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891.” (citing ch. 517, 
26 Stat. 826, 828)); see also LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS:  PROCESS AND POLICY 
264 (1986) (“The discretionary jurisdiction of some appellate courts over most types of 
cases is linked to the creation of appellate systems with two levels.”).     
45
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §§ 5–6, 26 Stat. at 827-28; FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, 
at 30 (“[T]he Act continued to permit Supreme Court review as of right in important 
classes of cases, subject in general to a jurisdictional amount requirement of $1,000.”).   
46
 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 5, 26 Stat. at 827-28.   
47
 See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (making decisions “final” in some criminal and admi-
ralty cases as well). 
48
Id.; see also Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650-51 (drawing from legislative history to 
conclude that the use of certiorari seemed to be “distinctly secondary”).   
49
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.   
50
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1656; see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1234-36 (de-
scribing how Congress intended certiorari to be used sparingly as a “safety valve”).   
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very circumscribed role for certiorari:  just two years after the enact-
ment of the Evarts Act, certiorari had been granted only two times.51
However, as time went by and the Court’s docket continued to 
grow, Congress included certiorari in additional jurisdictional acts.  
Notably, for example, in 1914, Congress responded to concerns about 
the state courts invalidating federal legislation by enabling the Court 
to use the discretionary writ of certiorari to review state court judg-
ments upholding federal rights.
 
52  In expanding the Court’s jurisdiction 
to cover cases upholding a federal right, Congress chose to use the dis-
cretionary writ of certiorari rather than a mandatory writ to “protect[] 
the already over-loaded Court from further obligatory jurisdiction.”53
In 1916, Congress passed the Webb Act, which again further em-
powered the Court to use certiorari.
 
54  The Act required that only cer-
tiorari be used to review certain state court judgments, including 
judgments denying and upholding certain federal rights, and it there-
by eliminated the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction over certain cases 
that had been obligatory since 1789.55  As various scholars have noted, 
the precise reason that Congress chose to expand certiorari in this way 
and to leave “a major area of undisputed national importance” to the 
Court’s discretion is a bit unclear.56  Indeed, the important certiorari 
innovation found in “the Act went through Congress without serious 
consideration, certainly without debate.”57  Perhaps this was because 
Congress was focused on the Act’s main aim of saving the Court from 
voluminous employers’ liability litigation,58
 
51
See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Fabre, 13 S. Ct. 1045, 1045 (1892) (granting certiorari 
without further opinion); Lau Ow Bew’s Case, 141 U.S. 583, 589 (1891) (granting cer-
tiorari but advising that “this branch of our jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly 
and with great caution”); see also Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. 
Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1893) (noting that Lau Ow Bew’s Case and Cunard Steamship 
were the only two cases in which the Court had granted certiorari).     
 or perhaps it was because 
52
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 
30 (attributing the expansion to Congress’s “hostility to state court decisions invalidat-
ing legislation under the Due Process Clause”); Linzer, supra note 24, at 1237-38 (ex-
plaining that Congress was seeking “a safety valve for anomalous cases”).   
53
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 196.   
54
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726 -27. 
55
See id.; see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1239-40 (explaining that after the 1916 
Webb Act, there was no longer an automatic right to review of federal claims in the 
Supreme Court unless “a treaty, statute or ‘authority’” was involved).  
56
Linzer, supra note 24, at 1239-40; cf. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 
213; Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1658. 
57
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 213 (noting that Congress passed the 
legislation “as though it were a perfunctory measure”). 
58
Id. 
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the measure was authored by Justice James Clark McReynolds, who 
was familiar with members of the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees due to his prior service as Attorney General.59
Next came the most significant congressional expansion of certi-
orari:  the passage of the Judges’ Bill of 1925 (also called the Judiciary 
Act).
  Regardless, the 
Act played an important role in certiorari’s transformation. 
60  The bill—called the Judges’ Bill because the Justices them-
selves drafted the legislation and Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
lobbied for the bill61—withdrew “all but a few categories of cases” from 
the Court’s mandatory docket and effectively “gave to the Court pow-
er to control its docket.”62  In lobbying for the bill, the Justices argued 
that their workload had become unmanageable and that they were 
forced to spend their time deciding cases that failed to raise important 
issues.63
Even the dramatic expansion of certiorari brought about by the 
Judges’ Bill, however, did not ultimately prove sufficient to deal with 
the Court’s workload issues.
  In this sense, both the Justices lobbying for the bill and the 
legislators who passed the bill seemed to understand that the need to 
delegate agenda-setting discretion to the Court flowed from function-
al concerns about the Court’s capacities and workload. 
64  The Court’s docket continued to grow, 
fueled by the growth of the economy and the administrative state and 
also by the Court’s recognition of new constitutional rights.65
 
59
Id. at 213-14.   
  Various 
proposals for alleviating the Court’s unmanageable workload began to 
surface, including a well-known study published in 1972 called the 
60
Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936. 
61
Linzer, supra note 24, at 1240-41.  
62
Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 459 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
63
See, e.g., Procedure in Federal Courts:  Hearing on S. 2060 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 45 (1924) (statement of Justice James C. McRey-
nolds) (“It will not be possible to keep up with the docket unless some way is found to 
relieve the court of relatively unimportant things.”); id. at 26 -27 (statement of Justice 
Willis Van Devanter) (noting that many cases are unnecessarily heard by the Court due 
to its obligatory jurisdiction). 
64
See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 50-51 (2009) (identifying reasons for the growth of the Supreme Court’s dock-
et in the latter half of the twentieth century). 
65
See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1402 (1987) (“The pattern has been clear:  as the nation’s 
population and economy have grown and as legal assistance has become more widely 
available, the number of cases filed in federal courts, the number of federal judges, 
and the Supreme Court’s docket have grown concurrently.”); Grove, supra note 64, at 
50-51 (noting that “the expanding federal administrative state and . . . changes in the 
Court’s own doctrine” were partly responsible for the increasing volume). 
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Freund Report, which recommended the “creation of a National 
Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review [then] 
filed in the Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many 
cases of conflicts between circuits.”66  The Freund Report did not suc-
ceed, but in 1988 Congress passed legislation67 that eliminated “vir-
tually all of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.”68  As a result, today 
only a very small number of cases fall within the Court’s mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction.69  These cases arise out of statutes in which 
Congress has called for mandatory review of the decisions of three-
judge district court panels, such as decisions in voting rights cases.70  
Otherwise, the Court today enjoys unfettered discretion to set its ap-
pellate docket.71
C.  Current Certiorari Practices 
 
In recent years, the Court has received around 8000 or 9000 certi-
orari petitions per year,72 but the Court has granted only about one 
percent of all petitions.73
 
66
FREUND REPORT, supra note 
  This extreme selectivity means that, in many 
7, at 590.   
67
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. 
68
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75-76 & n.11 (explaining which statutory 
provisions providing mandatory jurisdiction were repealed by the 1988 legislation).   
69
Id. at 75-76. 
70
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (providing that claims of unconstitutional voter 
disenfranchisement are to be raised to a three-judge district court panel and appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006) (permitting appeal to 
the Supreme Court for an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent 
injunction in a civil action before a three-judge district court panel). 
71
See Buchman, supra note 18, at 2 (asserting that the Court has shifted from an 
entirely mandatory to an “overwhelmingly discretionary” docket); see also FALLON ET 
AL., supra note 18, at 30 (noting that since the Judges’ Bill of 1925, “the principle of 
review at the Court’s discretion has become ever more dominant until, today, manda-
tory appellate jurisdiction has entirely disappeared in cases originating in state courts 
and has virtually disappeared in federal cases”).   
72
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 312 (noting that “the Justices consider and 
dispose of over eight thousand certiorari petitions each term”); see also, e.g., The Su-
preme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 (2010) (showing 9296 
total cases on the Court’s paid and in forma pauperis appellate docket during the 2009 
Term). 
73
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 321 (“During the nine terms from 1992 to 
2002, the Court granted 1.19 percent of the certiorari petitions filed.”); The Supreme 
Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, supra note 72, at 418 (noting that the Court granted 
review in 77 out of 8131 total cases, or 0.9%, on its appellate docket in 2009). 
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ways, the process of “deciding to decide”74 is just as important as the 
Court’s decisions on the merits of cases, if not even more important.75
The Court’s process for reviewing certiorari petitions is fairly sim-
ple.  Currently, all of the Justices except Justice Alito
 
76 participate in 
what is called the “cert pool,” whereby the Justices aggregate their law 
clerks and assign one law clerk from the group to each certiorari peti-
tion.77  Once a petition for certiorari is filed and circulated to the Jus-
tices’ chambers, the pool clerk assigned to that petition will review the 
petition and write a memo, recommending that the Court either 
grant or deny the petition or take some other action.78
After the pool memo is circulated within the Court, the Justices 
who participate in the pool review the memo, and occasionally the 
certiorari papers, before deciding whether a particular certiorari peti-





This phrase is taken from Deciding to Decide, H.W. Perry’s famous book.  H.W. 
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:  AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (1991). 
  The discuss list serves as 
75
See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social 
Agenda:  Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 
314-15 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s certiorari decisions set the national political 
and cultural agenda and determine the Court’s “institutional and moral authority”); see 
also sources cited supra note 7.   
76
Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom:  The ‘Cert. Pool,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A21 (noting that Justice Alito, like Justice Stevens before him, 
has opted out of the “cert. pool” and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of 
participation). 
77
See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 631 (explaining the history and 
functions of the cert pool and describing how law clerks writing memos for the pool 
“strive objectively to discern the reasons why petitions should be denied”). 
78
See Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars:  Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology 
in the Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (describing the creation of 
the cert pool in 1972 and its functions); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 233 
(2001) (describing law clerks’ memo-writing duties and Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on 
those memos); Andrew F. Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme 
Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 703-04 (2009) (“The [cert] pool thus seeks both to avoid 
unnecessary redundancy—each Justice and his clerks independently summarizing the 
facts and legal issues of a case—by dividing that work among the various clerks, and to 
preserve the important redundancy of each Justice independently voting whether to 
grant review.”).  Other actions that might be recommended by a pool clerk include 
calling for the views of the Solicitor General or requesting a response from the res-
pondent.  See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers:  The Role of Law Clerks in the 
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 991 (2007) (book review) (cataloguing cert pool 
recommendations in certain years from 1984 through 1992, which include actions 
other than simply granting or denying certiorari).     
79
Cf. REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 233-34 (noting that with a “large majority of 
the petitions,” he reviewed only cert pool memos, which would have been annotated 
by one of his own law clerks). 
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an internal court document—it is not circulated to the public or the 
parties—that lists those certiorari petitions that have been selected for 
discussion at conference by at least one Justice.80  Any one Justice has 
the power to place a certiorari petition on the discuss list simply by 
asking.81  Certiorari petitions not placed on the list are automatically 
denied without conference discussion, whereas those certiorari peti-
tions that are placed on the discuss list are discussed and voted on.82  
Justice Ginsburg has estimated that eighty-five percent of petitions are 
denied without discussion, meaning that only about fifteen percent 
are placed on the discuss list.83
If a certiorari petition does make the discuss list, then the Justices 
discuss and vote on the petition at conference.
 
84  These private confe-
rences are held behind closed doors with only the Justices in atten-
dance; no law clerks or aides may attend.85  Under the “Rule of Four,” 
a certiorari petition will be granted if at least four Justices vote to 
grant at conference.86  If there are fewer than four votes, certiorari is 
denied.87
When a certiorari petition is either granted or denied, the Court 




See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List:  Agenda 
Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (1990) (examining the 
“composition, sources, and implications” of the discuss list); see also GRESSMAN ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 320 (noting that “the [discuss] list is never made public” and that “it is 
futile to inquire whether a particular case did or did not make the discuss list”); John 
Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983) (noting 
the historical evolution from the use of a “dead list,” on which only those petitions that 
would be automatically denied were listed, to a “discuss list”).     
81
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 319. 
82
See id. (“[C]ases that do not appear on the list by the day before the conference 
are automatically denied without even being mentioned at conference.”); see also 
BAUM, supra note 44, at 264 (“Petitions for certiorari that fail to reach [the discuss] list 
are denied without collective consideration.”). 
83
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Thomas Jefferson Lecture:  Workways of the Supreme 
Court (Feb. 6, 2003), in 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 519-20 (2003); see also REHN-
QUIST, supra note 38, at 234 (remarking that if “there are one hundred petitions for 
certiorari on the conference list, the number discussed at conference will range from 
fifteen to thirty”). 
84
 GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 322-23. 
85
Id.; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 224 (“The conference[] . . . [is] at-
tended only by the justices themselves; they are not open to the public or to other 
Court personnel.”).     
86
See generally Stevens, supra note 80, at 10 (discussing the origins of the so-called 
“Rule of Four”).     
87
Id.; see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 324 (“Four votes are still required 
for a grant of certiorari.”).     
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plain its reasons for granting or denying certiorari.  Occasionally, Jus-
tices who disagree with the Court’s disposition of a certiorari petition 
will publish an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari,88 or 
will ask that their votes be noted in the Court’s order respecting certi-
orari.89  In addition, sometimes the Court will include a cursory ex-
planation of its decision to grant certiorari when the Court ultimately 
issues its opinion on the merits in the case.90  But in most cases, no 
explanation “is ever rendered for the Court’s action,” and “no record 
of the Court’s vote is ever published (regardless of whether the case is 
granted or denied).”91  Hence, as Carolyn Shapiro has noted, the 
Court exercises its discretion via a process that operates very much 
like a “black box” that is “shroud[ed] in intense secrecy.”92
Indeed, the only real insight the Court gives the public about the 
factors that motivate its certiorari decisions can be found in Supreme 
Court Rule 10.
 
93  However, Rule 10 merely provides a list of considera-
tions that the Court might, in its discretion, take into account when 
deciding whether to grant certiorari.  Specifically, Rule 10 stresses that 
“[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion,” and that the writ will be granted “only for compelling rea-
sons.”94
 
88 See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 (2011) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (“It is difficult to imagine a better case for certiorari.”); 
Nurre v. Whitehead, 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1940  (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“A decision with such potentially broad and troubling implications merits 
our review.”); see also Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 944-46 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari) (discussing the increase in the practice of dissent-
ing from denials of certiorari and whether these dissents serve any purpose); Linzer, 
supra note 
  Rule 10 does list the importance of the question presented 
24, at 1256-59 (describing the growth in the 1970s of the practice of writing 
dissents from certiorari denials); Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Guides Court’s Liberal Wing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010 at A10 (noting that just months into the 2010 Term, Justice 
Sotomayor had exercised her discretion to write three dissents from certiorari denials).       
89
See Linzer, supra note 24, at 1262 (explaining that some Justices will include a 
“bare notation[]” of dissent stating simply that “Mr. Justice Q would grant certiorari”); 
see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 331 (noting that dissents from denials “take 
forms ranging from a simple notation of a dissent to an elaborate dissenting opinion”).    
90
See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010) ( justify-
ing the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in order to resolve a “conflict”); Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009) (granting certiorari because of the importance of 
the preemption issue at stake and because the relevant agency had changed its opi-
nion); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (“The obvious importance of the case 
prompted our grant of certiorari.”). 
91
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 402. 
92
Shapiro, supra note 78 , at 103.  
93
SUP. CT. R. 10.   
94
Id. 
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and the presence of a conflict in the lower courts as factors that the 
Court might consider, but notes that these factors do not “control[] 
nor fully measur[e] the Court’s discretion.”95  Rule 10, accordingly, 
does nothing to diminish the near absolute discretion that Congress 
has given the Court.96
II.  THE RELEVANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
ANALOGY TO CERTIORARI REFORM 
 
The Court’s unfettered discretion to set its docket via certiorari 
has not gone unnoticed.  To the contrary, various scholars and Court 
watchers have criticized certiorari and proposed reforms.  However, 
these proposals for reform have focused primarily on forcing the 
Court to hear certain kinds of cases or to hear more cases, or alterna-
tively on taking certiorari discretion away from the Court and giving it 
to some other body, as will be described in this Part.  Largely missing 
from the dialogue has been much serious discussion about the source 
of the Court’s discretion (namely, various delegations from Congress) 
and how the broad discretion Congress has given to the Court might 
be constrained while leaving it with the Court.97  In particular, scho-
lars have failed to look to another area of the law that already has 





  Because administrative law is concerned with 
96
For a further discussion of Rule 10, see infra subsection III.A.3.  
97
One notable exception should be mentioned:  Hartnett has written a detailed 
article on certiorari that does focus on the source of the Court’s discretion, describing 
in detail Congress’s various legislative acts granting discretion to the Court.  See Hart-
nett, supra note 1, at 1650-57, 1713-30 (tracing the development of certiorari and also 
raising questions about certiorari practice).  However, Hartnett did not propose specif-
ic means of cabining the Court’s discretion.  His aim was to suggest that certiorari be 
questioned, not to propose specific solutions.  Id. at 1647.  
98
I am aware of only three works that briefly discuss administrative law principles 
in connection with certiorari.  The most relevant is a recent essay by Richard Lazarus 
that argues that the Court’s plenary docket “is increasingly captured by an elite group 
of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private bar,” and sug-
gests that the problem of docket capture might be solved by analogy to “the kinds of 
structural reforms that have been made in administrative agencies to reduce the risk of 
agency capture.”  Lazarus, supra note 11, at 89, 96.  The other two works are less on 
point, raising administrative law only in a fairly general sense.  One of these works is a 
piece by Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton, which suggests that when the Court 
makes certiorari decisions, the Court operates in an administrative fashion by manag-
ing our judicial system.  Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the 
Supreme Court’s Responsibilities, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 812 (1984).  Estreicher and Sex-
ton make one very direct analogy to administrative law, suggesting that perhaps the 
Court could take a cue from administrative law principles and disseminate its certiorari 
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controlling delegations to agencies and preventing arbitrary agency 
decisionmaking,99
A. Criticisms of Certiorari and Proposals for Reform 
 it stands as an untapped resource for suggesting po-
tential certiorari reforms. 
Complaints about certiorari are commonplace today.100  Many crit-
ics have focused on the Court’s shrinking docket, arguing that the 
Court should be hearing many more cases than it does.101  As Kenneth 
Starr has pointed out, “the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk from 
146 signed opinions during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s first year occu-
pying the Court’s center seat to just 74 signed opinions during his fi-
nal year.”102
In addition, some critics have focused on the type of cases the 
Court accepts, arguing that the Court is taking the wrong mix of cases.  
Senator Arlen Specter, for example, has complained that the Court is 
not taking enough “high-profile major constitutional cases,”
 
103 while 
Starr has asserted that the Court should take more cases that are less 
“headline-grabbing” in nature.104
 
standards for public comment.  Id. at 800.  I am aware of only one other work that 
mentions administrative law principles in the certiorari context:  Hartnett’s piece on 
the Judges’ Bill briefly summarizes Estreicher and Sexton’s work and notes that they 
seem to view certiorari as an exercise of managerial or administrative power.  See Hart-
nett, supra note 
  Some have argued that the Court is 
1, at 1726-30.   
99
See 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.1, at 1231 (4th 
ed. 2002) (“Much of administrative law is a response to the existence of broad discre-
tionary power in government officials.”); see also id. at 1227-28 (noting that “[m]any 
administrative law doctrines are a response” to the well-known problem that “confer-
ring too much discretion on an individual or institution creates the potential for harm 
attributable to abuse of discretion”). 
100
See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 11, at 1313-17 (noting several frequent complaints 
about the Supreme Court’s current certiorari practices).  But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If 
It Ain’t Broke . . . , 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 68-72 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
2010/01/07/wilkinson.html (defending the status quo in the certiorari context).   
101
See Margaret Cordray & Richard Cordray, Numbers That Don’t Befit the Court, 
WASH. POST, July 11, 2006, at A17 (“During the term just concluded, the court issued a 
grand total of 71 plenary decisions (in cases with full argument)—its lowest output 
since the Civil War.”); Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Court, AM. LAW., 
Dec. 2003, at 53, 53 (noting that “[i]f their productivity were measured by private sec-
tor standards, the Supremes might receive pink slips”); Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for 
Fewer Cases, and Professors and Lawyers Ponder Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A18 
(discussing possible reasons for the Court’s shrinking docket). 
102
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket:  The Ghost of Wil-
liam Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006). 
103
Arlen Specter, The Chamber of Secrets, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 38.   
104
Starr, supra note 102, at 1366.   
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not taking enough cases implicating circuit splits or disagreement in 
the courts below,105 or that the Court is not granting enough cases in 
areas of the law that are governed by standards rather than rules.106  In 
addition, Richard Lazarus has argued that the Court has been granting 
too many certiorari petitions filed by expert Supreme Court litigators 
who represent “the more powerful economic interests.”107
A few critics also seem concerned with the process the Court uses 
to make its certiorari decisions.  It is here that the cert pool and the 
role of law clerks have come under attack.  Starr, for example, has ar-
gued that the cert pool has become “too powerful,” giving clerks “an 




Others have speculated that the Court’s shrinking docket may—at 
least in part—be due to law clerks’ reluctance to stick out their necks 
and recommend grants in pool memos.109
In order to address some of the perceived problems with the 
Court’s current certiorari practices, numerous proposals for reform 
have been floated in the past few years alone.  For example, Starr re-
cently suggested one idea for reform:  the Court should “put its 
shoulder to the wheel and work harder” by hearing more cases.
 
110
  In 
addition, Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton recently proposed the 
creation of a Certiorari Division that would consist of thirteen Article 
III judges who would be tasked with “selecting perhaps as many as 120 
cases a term that the Court would be obliged to decide.”111
 
105
See, e.g., id. at 1365 (asserting that “the Supreme Court by and large does not 
even pretend to maintain the uniformity of federal law”).  
  Subse-
106 See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court:  Common Law Judging 
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 287-90 (2006) 
(decrying the Court for failing to distinguish between rules and standards in certiorari 
decisions).   
107
Lazarus, supra note 11, at 89.   
108
Starr, supra note 102, at 1366, 1376-77; see also Carrington & Cramton, supra 
note 12, at 632 (proposing to replace the cert pool “with a panel of experienced feder-
al judges”); Shapiro, supra note 106, at 286 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s reliance on the 
cert pool . . . increases the likelihood that chaotic areas of the law may be given short 
shrift, due to the law clerks’ and Justices’ unfamiliarity with more mundane areas of 
the law”).       
109
See Stras, supra note 78, at 968-72 (describing different views on the relationship 
between the cert pool and the decline of the Court’s plenary docket and concluding 
that the cert pool might be contributing to the decline).   
110
Starr, supra note 102, at 1383, 1385. 
111
Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 632.  This proposal was converted into 
draft legislation, garnered the signatures of nineteen proponents, predominantly law 
professors, and in 2009 was submitted to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 
See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, PAUL DEWITT CARRINGTON (Feb. 9, 2009), 
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quently, Sanford Levinson, using the Carrington and Cramton pro-
posal as a point of departure, suggested that the Certiorari Division 
might consist not only of federal judges, but also of state judges and 
public representatives.112
B.  Administrative Law as an Untapped Resource for Reform 
 
Despite all of the ink that scholars and Court watchers have spilled 
criticizing the Court’s certiorari discretion and proposing reforms, 
scholars studying certiorari generally have failed to look to administra-
tive law, an area whose central goal is constraining delegated discretion. 
Perhaps the failure to look to the lessons of administrative law 
when considering certiorari reform is understandable.  After all, at 
first blush, administrative law and the Supreme Court’s certiorari prac-
tice might not appear to share much in common.  The Court’s certi-
orari power involves questions about which cases the U.S. Supreme 
Court will hear, whereas administrative law involves questions sur-
rounding agency action and inaction, such as decisions made by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) about whether and how to 
regulate emissions that lead to global warming.113
 
http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm 
(laying out this and three other suggested reforms). 
  In addition, certi-
orari decisions are made by nine Justices who enjoy lifetime tenure 
and salary protections, whereas administrative law concerns itself with 
decisions made by officials who are much more accountable.  Fur-
thermore, although Congress could use the powers vested in it by Ar-
112 See Levinson, supra note 8, at 111 (suggesting that, on the subject of public rep-
resentatives, “[i]f there really is a point to the Supreme Court’s doing anything beyond 
providing uniform ‘solutions’ to conflicts below, then ordinary citizens should be able 
to offer their own valuable perspectives as to when intervention is needed (and when it 
is just fine to leave well enough alone)”).  Although Levinson does not explore poten-
tial constitutional hurdles that might stand in the way of his proposal, a few immediate-
ly come to mind.  For example, if the certiorari power is an exercise of legislative pow-
er, then Levinson’s proposal to delegate the certiorari process to nongovernmental 
actors might raise serious constitutional issues.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936) (holding unconstitutional the delegation of the power to set 
maximum hour and minimum wage provisions to coal industry executives); 1 PIERCE, 
supra note 99, § 2.6, at 93 (describing how the “Court continues to impose meaningful 
limits on congressional delegation of regulatory power to private parties”).  Alterna-
tively, if the certiorari power is an exercise of judicial power, then Levinson’s proposal 
might violate the so-called “oneness” principle found in Article III.  See U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in “one supreme Court” and in such lower federal 
courts as Congress shall create (emphasis added)).  
113
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 514 (2007) (reviewing the EPA’s refusal 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). 
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ticle III, Section 2 of the Constitution to regulate which cases the 
Court hears,114
Despite these differences, administrative law and certiorari share 
much more in common than might immediately be apparent.  Specif-
ically, both certiorari and administrative law involve Congress delegat-
ing broad discretion to other governmental actors, largely for func-
tional reasons relating to expertise and flexibility.  These delegations 
of policymaking power, in turn, raise concerns that principles of ac-
countability, transparency, and rationality might be subverted. 
 Congress cannot decide the merits of constitutional 
cases facing the Court, whereas Congress could decide the merits of 
policy matters that it chooses to delegate to agencies. 
Beginning with the world of administrative law, Congress routine-
ly hands over broad policymaking powers to agencies—power that 
Congress could have chosen to exercise itself.  For example, Congress 
has given the EPA the authority to regulate new motor vehicle emis-
sions that lead to global warming.115  Similarly, Congress recently gave 
the FDA the power to regulate tobacco products.116  These sorts of 
delegations to agencies arise largely for functional reasons relating to 
agency expertise, specialization, and flexibility.117  Congress, in other 
words, chooses to transfer large portions of quasi-legislative power to 
various federal agencies largely because “Congress lacks the capacity—
the expertise, the resources, the time, the foresight, the flexibility—to 
address every detail that might prove to be relevant to any given legis-
lative scheme.”118
 
114 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate Jurisdiction” over certain types of cases “with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make” (emphasis added)). 
 
115
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34 (holding that the Clean Air Act empowers 
the EPA to regulate new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and concluding that 
the agency’s reasons for denying a rulemaking petition were arbitrary and capricious).   
116 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
§ 3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387 note (2006 & Supp. 2010)).     
117
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 
440-41 (1987) (suggesting that the increase in grants of authority to regulatory agencies 
during the New Deal was motivated in part by a conception of administrative agencies 
“as politically insulated, self-starting, and technically sophisticated”); Alexander Dill, 
Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha:  A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 
33 EMORY L.J. 953, 953 (1984) (“Congress has routinely granted broad discretionary 
authority to agencies in order to accord them the flexibility necessary in highly tech-
nical areas of regulation such as nuclear energy and environmental health, as well as in 
areas of economic regulation such as banking and corporate securities . . . .”).   
118
Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate:  Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 412 (2008). 
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Despite the compelling practical reasons for Congress to delegate 
to agencies, these delegations have not been without controversy.  In 
particular, many administrative law scholars have argued that Con-
gress’s decisions to legislate only in very broad strokes and to leave the 
details of policymaking up to agencies threaten principles of accoun-
tability, transparency, and rationality.  For example, Martin Redish has 
argued that delegations of policymaking powers to agencies undermine 
accountability “by removing basic social policy choices from those who 
are most representative of and accountable to the electorate.”119
Although today we routinely allow broad delegations of power to 
administrative agencies, concerns about accountability, transparency, 
and rationality have not gone completely unheeded.  To the contrary, 
administrative law’s primary purpose has been to develop various legal 
structures and mechanisms—such as political oversight, judicial re-
view, public participation, and reason-giving requirements—that help 
to legitimate and control agency action.
   
120
Now compare Congress’s delegations in the administrative world 
with Congress’s delegation to the Court in the certiorari context.  Giv-
en that Article III expressly empowers Congress to make exceptions to 
and regulations governing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,
 
121 Con-
gress could have chosen to precisely delineate the cases that the Court 




MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 142 (1995); 
see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-
34 (1980) (discussing the incentives for, and problems raised by, risk-averse legislators 
passing off substantive and contentious policy decisions onto “executive-branch bureau-
crat[s]” and “independent regulatory comission[s]”).  See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DEL-
EGATION 99-152, 155-77 (1993) (criticizing Congress’s delegation to administrative agen-
cies and suggesting a revival of the nondelegation doctrine). 
  Nonetheless, rather than defining which cases the Court 
120
See generally KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31 (2008) 
(“Americans have relied on administrative law to ensure that agencies perform [their] 
functions with due regard for the rule of law, a proper respect for individual rights, 
and a sense of fidelity to our deepest constitutional commitments.”).   
121
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate Jurisdiction” over certain types of cases “with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make” (emphasis added)).     
122
Cf. James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction—Reform Proposals, Discre-
tionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REV. 895, 907 (1973) (“The kinds of ju-
risdictional decisions that Congress normally makes for the federal judiciary as a whole 
it delegated to the Justices through passage of the 1925 Act.”); Daniel J. Meador, Rein-
ing in the Superlegislature:  A Response to Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 657, 660 (2009) (“Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurists would have found 
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would hear, Congress chose to delegate policymaking power to the 
Court, giving the Court the discretion to decide which cases are im-
portant enough to warrant review.  The Court is free to decide, for 
example, that fact-bound cases involving mere error correction or 
cases involving the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law do 
not warrant review.123  Although today we are well accustomed to the 
notion that the Court enjoys such broad discretion (just as we are by 
now well accustomed to the notion that agencies can and do wield 
significant policymaking powers), the Court’s wide discretion in this 
area (just like agencies’ broad discretion to set policy) exists as a re-
sult of legislative delegation.124
Much like in the administrative law world, Congress’s willingness 
to give the Court broad discretion can be explained largely by func-
tional concerns relating to expertise and flexibility.  Congressional tes-
timony given by Solicitor General Beck in 1922 prior to the passage of 
the Judges’ Bill, for example, helps to highlight the themes of exper-
tise and flexibility that motivated the transfer of power from Congress 
to the Court.  According to the Solicitor General, “[s]omebody must 
determine” which are “the cases of public importance,” and “[t]he 
court can do that far better than can any hard and fast law describing 
what cases shall be heard and what cases shall not be heard.”
 
125  Simi-
larly, in advocating for the passage of the Judges’ Bill, Chief Justice 
Taft drew on notions of expertise:  “His essential message to Congress 
was ‘trust us.’”126
 
the concept [of discretionary appellate jurisdiction] novel and inconsistent with the 
role of a court, especially in a separation-of-powers regime.”). 
  Presumably, these notions of expertise and flexibility 
were not entirely unfamiliar to Congress when it was considering the 
123
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly 
stated rule of law.”). 
124
Some have implied otherwise, suggesting that the Court’s power to set its own 
docket is an inherent judicial function.  For example, Justice Arthur Goldberg once 
stated that “[t]he power to decide cases presupposes the power to determine what cas-
es will be decided.”  Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund 
Study Group’s Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A. J. 721, 730 (1973) (statement of Chief 
Justice Earl Warren) (quoting Justice Goldberg); see also Brennan, supra note 7, at 484 
(agreeing with Justice Goldberg).  However, as Meador has aptly explained, a claim 
that the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is “inherent in and inseparable from 
the Justices’ jurisdiction to decide cases on their merits” confuses “the familiar with the 
necessary.”  Meador, supra note 122, at 661. 
125
Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court:  Hearing on 
H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 26 (1922) (statement of 
James M. Beck, Solicitor General). 
126
Starr, supra note 102, at 1364.     
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Judges’ Bill, given that the bill was enacted in 1925—roughly around 
the same time that Congress was delegating increasingly broad powers 
to agencies and was creating significant new agencies, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission in 1914.127
As with delegations to agencies in the administrative world, Con-
gress’s decision to delegate policymaking power to the Court has gen-
erated concern that principles of accountability, transparency, and ra-
tionality are being evaded.  For example, two scholars have noted that 
certiorari is “striking,” because unlike judicial evaluation of cases on 
the merits, certiorari lacks “collegial deliberation, constraining crite-
ria, majority rule, and public accountability.”
 
128
  Similarly, Harnett has 
argued that “[t]he ability to set one’s own agenda is at the heart of ex-
ercising will” and that certiorari is difficult to reconcile with “rule of 
law” principles.129
 III.  CHECKS ON CERTIORARI VS. CHECKS ON  
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
  Hence, Congress’s delegation to the Court in the 
certiorari context raises many of the same concerns as do Congress’s 
delegations to agencies. 
Even though congressional delegation of docket control to the 
Court raises many of the same concerns as does congressional delega-
tion of discretion to administrative agencies, administrative law’s les-
sons have not been carried over and applied in the certiorari context.  
Certiorari does not appear to comport with the so-called nondelega-
tion doctrine.  Nor is the Court’s discretion constrained by other sof-
ter administrative law mechanisms, including political oversight, pub-
lic participation, judicial review, and reason-giving requirements.  This 
 
127
Cf. WERHAN, supra note 120, at 13-18 (describing the birth of the modern ad-
ministrative state during the Progressive Era and noting that Progressives believed in 
expert-driven decisionmaking by specialists); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue 
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 
504 -20 (2002) (describing the creation of new agencies and the delegation of power to 
agencies in the Progressive and New Deal eras).  Increased delegation to the Court via 
the Judges’ Bill also occurred less than a decade prior to the passage of the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, which gave the Supreme Court the power to prescribe general 
rules for the district courts.  See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 
1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).  See generally Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (providing a de-
tailed overview of the Rules Enabling Act). 
128
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 398. 
129
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1718, 1722. 
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leaves the Court’s broad discretion—unlike agencies’ delegated poli-
cymaking discretion—unchecked and unconstrained. 
A.  The Nondelegation Doctrine 
When Congress delegates legislative-like power to administrative 
agencies, the so-called “nondelegation doctrine” operates as a check 
to constrain these delegations.  The nondelegation doctrine is based 
on Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States.”130  For close to 200 years, “the Court has interpreted 
that provision to prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative 
power and has equated legislative power with policymaking.”131  Our 
constitutional commitment to representative democracy provides a 
major reason for reading the Constitution this way:  by ensuring that 
the most democratic branch conducts our lawmaking, principles of 
political accountability are protected.132
Despite generally reading the Constitution to prohibit delegations 
of legislative authority, the Court has never erected a very rigid line 
between permissible and impermissible delegations.  The inquiry cur-
rently used by the Court, which was first articulated in 1928 in J.W. 






U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
  When Congress sets forth an intelligible principle, 
then the entity exercising the delegated power is deemed to be acting 
131
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008).  However, in recent 
years, some scholars and judges have questioned this view.  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the text of Article I’s Vesting 
Clause “do[es] not purport to limit the authority of [Congress] to delegate authority to 
others”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1:  From Nondelegation to Exclu-
sive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2109-14, 2165-66 (2004) (arguing for an ex-
clusive delegation doctrine under which Congress has the exclusive power to decide 
when and whether to delegate lawmaking powers). 
132
See WERHAN, supra note 120, at 44-45 (noting that it “would subvert the political 
accountability hardwired into the legislative process for Congress to farm out its law-
making authority to institutions that are less democratic, and therefore less accounta-
ble, in their decisionmaking”).  But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administra-
tors Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985) (arguing that in 
light of the existence of presidential elections, “it may make sense to imagine the dele-
gation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsive-
ness of government to the desires of the electorate”).   
133
See 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [regulate] is directed 
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).   
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in the mere execution of a congressional act and not in a legislative 
capacity.134
Although the Court generally has taken an extremely lenient view 
of the intelligible principle requirement,
 
135 the nondelegation doc-
trine is not completely dead.136  Litigants continue to mount nondele-
gation challenges,137 and some judges continue to bite.138  In addition, 
courts sometimes adopt narrow constructions of statutes in order to 
“corral[] what might otherwise be a constitutionally excessive delega-
tion of power.”139  Hence, even in its weakened form, the nondelega-
tion doctrine persists, acting in some ways like the “Energizer Bunny 
of constitutional law,” as Gary Lawson has put it.140
 
134
Id. at 410-11.   
 
135
The Court has upheld many vague delegations of power, such as delegations to 
regulate in the “public interest.”  See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) 
(upholding Congress’s delegation to the FCC to regulate broadcasting licensing “as pub-
lic interest, convenience, or necessity” warrant); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 
307 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1939) (upholding Congress’s delegation to the Secretary of 
Agriculture to regulate milk prices in the “public interest”).  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has found the requisite intelligible principle lacking in only two cases, both involv-
ing delegations found in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA).  See 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (ruling 
that section 3 of the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to 
the President); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-19 (1935) (ruling that section 
9(c) of the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
136
See Lemos, supra note 118, at 419 (arguing that it would be a “mistake” to dec-
lare the nondelegation doctrine dead). 
137
See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 11-24, Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Chertoff, 554 U.S. 918 (2008) (No. 07-1180), 2008 WL 727967 (arguing that section 
102(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Origi-
nal Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002) (noting a “series of attempts by lawyers and 
judges in the past decade” to keep the nondelegation doctrine alive).        
138
See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 33-40 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute giving the Secretary of the In-
terior the power to acquire lands “in his discretion” violated the nondelegation doc-
trine); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the EPA had relied on a construction of its authority-granting statute that violated 
the nondelegation doctrine), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Truck-
ing Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 69 F.3d 
878, 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that delegation to the Secretary of the Interior 
to acquire lands “in his discretion” violated the nondelegation doctrine), vacated and 
remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).     
139
Lemos, supra note 118, at 455; see also Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum 
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 659-62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (requiring the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration to make a finding of significant risk in promulgating 
its safety regulations).   
140
Lawson, supra note 137, at 330. 
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In contrast to the longstanding role that the nondelegation doc-
trine has played in administrative law, the nondelegation doctrine has 
been largely absent when it comes to delegations of lawmaking power 
to the courts.  As Margaret Lemos has thoroughly described, the volu-
minous scholarship on the nondelegation doctrine thus far has fo-
cused primarily on delegations of lawmaking power to administrative 
agencies and generally has failed to consider whether the doctrine can 
or should be used to constrain delegations to courts.141  This has been 
the case even though Congress routinely delegates lawmaking power 
to the courts.142  Lemos, accordingly, has persuasively called for more 
conversation about delegations to courts, suggesting that these delega-
tions should not necessarily be immune from nondelegation chal-
lenges.143
If one were to apply nondelegation-esque principles to Congress’s 
delegation of docket-setting power to the Court, then an “intelligible 
principle” would need to be identified.  In searching for an intelligi-
ble principle, three possible sources seem worthy of consideration:  
(1) statutory text defining the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction; (2) legis-
lative history surrounding Congress’s decisions to give the Court a dis-
cretionary docket; and (3) the Court’s own published rules.  Unfortu-
nately, however, even if these sources were all appropriate places to 
search for an intelligible principle, they fail to supply a guiding prin-
ciple sufficient for even today’s weakened version of the nondelega-
tion doctrine. 
 
1.  Statutory Text 
Various statutes define the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.  For ex-
ample, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 speaks to the Court’s power to review deci-
sions from the federal courts of appeals, providing that the Court 
“may” review cases in the courts of appeals “[b]y writ of certiorari 
granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, 
 
141
See Lemos, supra note 118, at 421 (“[N]otwithstanding the robust and ever-
growing body of law and commentary on the boundaries of permissible delegations to 
agencies, we lack any account of the constitutional status of delegations of lawmaking 
authority to courts.”). 
142
See id. at 428-34 (discussing congressional delegations to the courts and point-
ing to the Sherman Act as an example of “a clear-cut and self-conscious delegation of 
lawmaking power to courts”). 
143
See id. at 475-76 (“Nondelegation law and theory ignore courts at their pe-
ril . . . . Delegation to courts raise the same constitutional concerns as delegations to 
agencies.”).   
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before or after rendition of judgment or decree.”144
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in 
question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in ques-
tion on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, 
or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or im-
munity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the trea-
ties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, 
the United States.
  Nothing in this 
statutory text, however, helps to define when the Court should exercise 
its discretion to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari that otherwise 
falls within § 1254’s grant of jurisdiction.  Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 
which speaks to the Court’s ability to review final judgments from the 
states, provides only that review “may” be had via certiorari 
145
Just like § 1254, nothing in § 1257 sets forth a principle to guide when 
the Court might refuse to hear a case that otherwise falls within the 
jurisdiction created by § 1257.
 
146
2.  Legislative History 
  Hence, the statutory text appears to 
give the Court unconstrained discretion to refuse to hear a case that 
otherwise falls within the Court’s statutorily defined jurisdiction for 
any reason or for no reason at all. 
In searching for an intelligible principle with which to constrain 
delegations, the courts have sometimes looked not only to statutory text 
but also to legislative history.147
As Hartnett has described in an article detailing the emergence of 
the certiorari process, the legislative history leading up to and sur-
rounding the landmark Judges’ Bill of 1925 contains little clarification 
  In the certiorari context, however, the 
relevant legislative history—like the statutory text—fails to provide any 
meaningful criteria that could be read to guide the Court’s discretion. 
 
144
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).   
145
Id. § 1257.   
146
To fit within the Court’s jurisdiction, of course, the statute makes clear that the 
judgment below must be “final” and that the judgment must have been rendered by 
the “highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.”  Id.  However, once 
these and other statutory requirements are met, the statute says nothing about when 
the Court may exercise its discretion to decline to hear a case.   
147
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375-76 nn.9-10 (1989) (look-
ing to legislative history for elaboration on the purposes of various statutory factors); 
Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (“One of the primary sources looked to by this Court in adding gloss to an 
otherwise broad grant of legislative authority is the legislative history of the statute in 
question.”).  
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about what specific standards, if any, were to guide the Court’s discre-
tion.148  In fact, in advocating in 1914 for expanded certiorari jurisdic-
tion, William Howard Taft (later to become Chief Justice and the cen-
tral proponent of the Judges’ Bill) spoke initially of the need to give 
the Court “absolute and arbitrary discretion with respect to all business 
but constitutional business.”149
When Taft subsequently appeared before the House Judiciary 
Committee in 1922 (then as Chief Justice) with proposed legislation 
designed to expand certiorari,
 
150
The Supreme Court’s function is for the purpose of expounding and 
stabilizing principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing 
upon constitutional questions and other important questions of law for 
the public benefit.  It is to preserve uniformity of decision among the in-
termediate courts of appeal.
 Taft described the “proper basis for 
determining the class of cases which should be reviewed” in a slightly 
more reserved fashion, stating: 
151
In addition, Taft explained that “[t]he question is whether the ques-
tions as presented are sufficiently important, considering the function 
that the Supreme Court has to play—to justify and require the court 
to let the case into the court for a full hearing on the merits.”
 
152
The additional legislative history surrounding the passage of the 
Judges’ Act of 1925 does not supply any more precise standards.  At 
most, the legislative history provides repeated promises from the Jus-
tices about how certiorari was to be used to review cases of “public im-
  This 
rather vague description of the principles that would guide the Court 
in granting certiorari was about as specific as Taft got. 
 
148
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1660-704 (detailing at length the history of certi-
orari, including the Judges’ Bill of 1925).   
149
William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 18 
(1916) (emphasis added).      
150
For a discussion of Taft’s role in lobbying the Court for passage of the Judges’ 
Bill, see Buchman, supra note 18, at 3.  Buchman states that “Taft’s campaign can be 
explained best by the interaction of two factors:  a lobbying campaign designed to em-
phasize the belief that the bill implicated merely technical matters, and congruence 
between the policy preferences of a congressional majority and the Court.”  Id.; see also 
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1660-704 (discussing Taft’s prominent role in the lobbying 
process).   
151
Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court:  Hearing 
on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922) [hereinafter 
Hearing on H.R. 10479] (statement of Chief Justice William H. Taft) (emphasis added).  
152
Id.   
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portance,”153 cases that needed to be decided to serve the “public ben-
efit,”154 and cases that create a conflict in the courts.155  In addition, 
the Justices promised to grant review when the circuit courts “certi-
fied” the questions arising in the case.156
These sorts of vague promises made primarily by members of the 
Court itself, however, seem insufficient to provide a congressionally 
imposed “intelligible principle.”
 
157  In hindsight, it seems quite clear 
that these vague statements made by the Justices have not in fact of-
fered any kind of meaningful constraint on the Court’s discretion.158  
For example, contrary to what the Justices promised, it is not unheard 




See, e.g., Procedure in Federal Courts:  Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Sub-
comm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 21 (1924) (reporting that “[i]f this bill 
becomes law, every case now reviewable in the Supreme Court will still be subject to 
review there, if the court finds that it presents any question which should, in the public 
interest, engage its attention”); Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme 
Court of the United States:  Hearing on H.R. 8206 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong. 7 (1924) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 8206] (statement of Justice Willis Van De-
vanter) (suggesting that the Court would grant cases that presented questions “of public 
importance or of wide general interest”); id. at 22 (statement of Justice James C. McRey-
nolds) (emphasizing that the Court should not decide a case unless it is “of particular 
importance” or it “involves[s] something more than the mere rights of the litigants”).   
  Similarly, despite the Justices’ reassurances 
154
Hearing on H.R. 10479, supra note 151, at 2 (statement of Chief Justice William 
H. Taft).  
155
See id. (“Whenever a petition for certiorari presents a question on which one 
circuit court of appeals differs from another, then we let the case come into our court 
as a matter of course.”).   
156
See id., at 3; see also Hearing on H.R. 8206, supra note 153, at 8 (statement of Jus-
tice Willis Van Devanter) (indicating that the Court would grant cases that needed to 
be decided “in the interest of uniformity”). 
157
Even if the legislative history could be said to supply some kind of a guiding 
principle, there is also the question of whether legislative history alone can supply the 
requisite intelligible principle or whether the principle must be tethered to some am-
biguous statutory text.  See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 
23, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven in a nondelegation challenge, 
a court must find meaning for an ambiguous phrase in some relevant text.”).   
158
Cf. Stevens, supra note 80, at 14 (rejecting the notion that “representations 
made to Congress when the 1925 Judges’ Bill was enacted created some sort of estop-
pel that would make it dishonorable for the Court to change the Rule of Four”).   
159
See, e.g., Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 925 (1992) (Stevens, J., res-
pecting the denial of certiorari) (defending the Court’s denial of certiorari and ar-
guing that “[s]ome conflicts are tolerable”); Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 
1039 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (noting he had dissented from the denial of certi-
orari forty-eight times that term because “there were conflicts among Courts of Ap-
peals sufficiently crystallized to warrant certiorari” and that he had dissented seven 
other times where there were “differences on the same federal issue between Courts of 
Appeals and state courts”).    
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
32 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1 
that the Court would decide issues certified by the lower courts, the 
Court has essentially killed the practice of certification, effectively 
rendering it “a dead letter.”160
3.  Supreme Court Rule 10 
 
The Supreme Court’s own rules provide a final place to look for 
some kind of intelligible principle that could guide the Court’s discre-
tion.  Specifically, Rule 10 might be thought to serve as a legal text set-
ting forth a constraining principle.  However, even a quick reading of 
Rule 10 demonstrates that this is not the case: 
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compel-
ling reasons.  The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring 
the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court con-
siders: 
 (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way 
that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of 
this Court’s supervisory power; 
 (b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal ques-
tion in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last 
resort or of a United States court of appeals; 
 (c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, set-
tled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way 
that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. 
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted er-
ror consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a 
properly stated rule of law.
161






Hartnett, supra note 
  Rather, the rule merely sets forth some relevant, 
1, at 1712; see also Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme 
Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 483, 487 (2010) (noting that 
the last time the Court even mentioned certification was more than twelve years earlier 
in 1996 (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996))); Tyler, supra note 11, at 
1319 (proposing that the Court resume using the process of certification).    
161
SUP. CT. R. 10 (emphasis added).  
162
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1721 (explaining that Rule 10 fails to provide con-
trolling standards). 
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nonbinding considerations.163  Some of these considerations might 
well operate in practice as the functional equivalent of jurisdiction-
defining rules.  For example, Rule 10 makes clear that a petition for 
certiorari will rarely be granted “when the asserted error consists of er-
roneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule 
of law,”164 and the Court has been quite unyielding in refusing to take 
cases that are splitless or involve fact-bound error correction.165
Furthermore, even if Rule 10 could be read as a constraining 
principle, it still does not supply the kind of intelligible principle that 
would be required if the traditional nondelegation doctrine were ap-
plied.  This is because the relevant question in nondelegation chal-
lenges is whether Congress has set down via “legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed 
to conform.”
  Yet 
given that the rule expressly reserves the Court’s discretion, it seems 
difficult to say that Rule 10 sets forth a constraining principle. 
166  As Justice Scalia explained in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns, an agency cannot “cure an unlawful delegation of leg-
islative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of 
the statute.”167
B.  Softer Mechanisms for Control 
  In the certiorari context, there is no such limiting 
principle set forth by Congress.  Hence, Congress’s delegation to the 
Court is not constrained by the kind of guiding principle—not even a 
vague, open-ended standard—that exists in a congressional delegation 
to an administrative agency. 
The fact that current certiorari practices would fail any strict ap-
plication of the nondelegation doctrine might not be all that troub-
 
163
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the considerations listed are neither binding nor 
exclusive); see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 126 (“The Court’s own rule on the subject 
says that it neither controls nor fully measures the Court’s discretion, and, broad as it 
is, the rule does not in fact do so.”). 
164
SUP. CT. R. 10.   
165
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless:  The Certiorari Process as Barrier 
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 980 (2009) (“The Court will agree to de-
cide few ‘splitless’ or ‘factbound’ cases unless there are extraordinary circumstances, 
such as unusual importance to the question or an atypical lower court error.”). 
166
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (alteration in origi-
nal) (emphasis added) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
394, 409 (1928)); see also id. at 473 (“The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitu-
tionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power 
seems to us internally contradictory.”). 
167
Id. at 472. 
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ling, given that courts have largely abandoned direct enforcement of 
the intelligible principle requirement, even in the administrative law 
context.168
1.  Political Accountability and Oversight 
  But in the administrative law world, substantial delegations 
of significant policymaking power to agencies have been allowed in 
large part because a variety of more informal mechanisms for con-
straint—including political oversight, judicial review, public participa-
tion, and reason-giving requirements—operate to check administra-
tive discretion and to facilitate accountability and transparency.  In the 
certiorari context, these more informal mechanisms for constraint are 
absent. 
Political accountability and oversight are two of the most signifi-
cant checks on agency discretion.169  Although agency heads are not 
directly accountable to the people,170 the heads of both independent 
and executive agencies are subject to varying degrees of political con-
trol from the President, Congress, or both.171  Congress, for example, 
creates agencies and controls their budgets.172  In addition, Congress 
can influence agency policymaking via oversight hearings, as well as 
through more informal communications.173  Similarly, the President 
plays a “unique role . . . in overseeing agency action.”174
 
168
See Lemos, supra note 
  The President, 
for example, has the power to appoint and remove certain agency of-
ficials (although independent agency heads are insulated from the 
118, at 418-19 (noting that the Supreme Court has not 
directly enforced the nondelegation doctrine in decades). 
169
See 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 1246.   
170
See Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking:  The President Is No Stranger, 
36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987) (“We vote for presidents, not secretaries or adminis-
trators.”).  
171
See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Re-
view, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35-37 (2009); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (“[I]ndependent agencies are sheltered not from politics but 
from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from presiden-
tial oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to 
congressional direction.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2384 (2001) (“Presidential administration . . . advances political accountability by 
subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism most open to public examina-
tion and most responsive to public opinion.”).   
172
See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84 
(2006) (“One way in which Congress has supervised agencies . . . is through the ap-
propriations process.  The power of the purse is among Congress’s most potent wea-
pons in its effort to control the execution of the laws.”).    
173
See id. at 121-35.  
174
 Watts, supra note 171, at 35. 
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President’s at-will removal powers).175  The President can also pressure 
or steer agency decisionmakers via informal mechanisms, like jawbon-
ing, as well as more formal mechanisms, such as executive orders.176
Indeed, in recent years, many have come to see the legitimacy of 
the administrative state as hinging on the notion that agencies are po-
litically accountable because of their relationship with Congress and 
the President.
 
177  The Supreme Court, for example, famously ex-
plained the legitimacy of judicial deference to agencies in 1984 in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., by relying 
on the notion that agencies are accountable to the “Chief Executive,” 
who is “directly accountable to the people.”178  Similarly, in arguing in 
favor of the permissibility of broad delegations of legislative power to 
administrative agencies, some scholars have relied upon the demo-
cratic accountability of agencies, with prominent scholars like Jerry 
Mashaw emphasizing that delegations to agencies may actually be a 
“device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires 
of the general electorate.”179
In contrast to the heads of agencies, the Justices of the Supreme 





See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating the President’s appointment 
powers and constraints thereon); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988) (dis-
cussing the President’s appointment and removal powers and noting that principal 
officers may only be selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Se-
nate, but that inferior officers may be appointed by “the President alone, by the heads 
of departments, or by the Judiciary,” in Congress’s discretion); see also Watts, supra note 
  Al-
though the Justices are chosen by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, they enjoy salary protections and life tenure 
171, at 57-62 (explaining that while the President does not enjoy removal power over 
independent agency heads, he can use other means to control independent agencies, 
such as informal contacts and pressure).     
176
See generally Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Reg-
ulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1261 (2006) (describing how Reagan “tapped 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review agency rulemaking and help 
streamline the administrative state”); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies:  
Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944-47 (1980) (discussing the 
various modes of interaction between the Carter Administration and federal agencies).   
177
See generally Watts, supra note 171, at 35-39 (describing the rise of the political-
control model of agency decisionmaking).   
178
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).  
179
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:  USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152 (1997). 
180
See Lemos, supra note 118, at 449-50 (noting that courts are not subject to the 
same political controls as agencies).   
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subject only to impeachment.181  Congress does have some ability to 
exert indirect control over the Court by using the Exceptions Clause 
to limit the Court’s jurisdiction,182 acting under its Spending Clause 
powers to cut back on the Court’s budget,183 or exercising its general 
lawmaking powers to overturn a statutory construction rendered by 
the Court.184  In addition, because the Court enjoys neither the power 
of the purse nor the sword, the Court depends on the coordinate 
branches and the American public to enforce and follow its judg-
ments.185
2.  Public Participation 
  Otherwise, however, the members of the Court—unlike the 
heads of agencies—are insulated from direct political oversight. 
Public participation is yet another way in which administrative dis-
cretion—at least in the rulemaking realm—is subject to significant ex-
ternal checks.  When promulgating rules via informal notice-and-
comment rulemaking, for example, agencies generally must provide 
public notice of the proposed rulemaking, allow the public to submit 
comments responding to the proposed rulemaking, and respond in a 
 
181 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.”).   
182
See id. § 2 (giving Congress the power to make exceptions to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction).  For literature discussing the longstanding debate 
about the extent of Congress’s powers to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear particu-
lar kinds of cases (such as cases involving abortion or school prayer), see generally 
Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960), and Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:  Constitutional Limi-
tations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 17 (1981). 
183
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).  See generally Eugenia Froedge 
Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court:  The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131, 132-35 (1991) (discussing Congress’s control over the Court’s budg-
et as a mechanism to signal its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision-
making).   
184
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpreta-
tion Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (providing an empirical analysis showing 
that Congress overrides the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting statutes on average 
ten times per Congress). 
185
Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 369-72 (2009) (arguing that the 
Court listens closely to and is in dialogue with the public and political actors).   
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reasoned way to all significant public comments.186  Interested mem-
bers of the modern tech-savvy public have to go no further than their 
computers to easily locate proposed rules and file comments electron-
ically.187  In addition, interested members of the public can petition 
agencies to engage in rulemaking, thereby playing a role in setting 
agency agendas.188
Unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings that have 
the benefit of public participation, the Court’s certiorari decisions are 
made behind closed doors and cannot easily be monitored by Con-
gress, the President, or the public.
  Hence, rulemaking proceedings conducted by 
agencies are quite accessible to the public. 
189  In making certiorari decisions, 
the Court generally relies only upon the opinion below, the written 
submissions of the parties to the case, and any briefs filed at the certi-
orari stage by amici curiae who have the means to hire an attorney 
and pay the costs of drafting and printing a formal brief.190
The public did not have an opportunity to comment on or partic-
ipate in the rulemaking process for Supreme Court Rule 10, which de-
fines the factors that the Court may take into account when granting 
or denying certiorari.
  Accor-
dingly, opportunities for general public input on specific certiorari 
petitions do not exist. 
191  A federal statute granting the federal courts 
general powers to promulgate “rules for the conduct of their business” 
does call for courts to give the public notice and an opportunity for 
comment on proposed rules, but that statute explicitly exempts the 
Supreme Court from these requirements.192
 
186
See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 
  The Supreme Court, ac-
cordingly, is not required to offer an opportunity for public comment 
99, at §§ 7.3–7.4 (discussing notice and com-
ment requirements).   
187
See REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) 
(enabling members of the public to search for proposed rules, submit and read com-
ments, and locate final rules).   
188
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the 
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). 
189
See generally 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 1247-48 (noting that various pro-
cedural requirements, such as the requirement that agencies obtain the views of in-
terested parties, help to shape the exercise of agency discretion).   
190 See infra text accompanying notes 304 -05 (arguing for greater public participa-
tion as amici curiae).   
191
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing considerations important to the Court in deciding 
whether to grant certiorari). 
192
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006) (“Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the 
Supreme Court, under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate 
public notice and an opportunity for comment.”(emphasis added)). 
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
38 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1 
in its rulemaking process and did not elect to do so until 1995193—
long after the basic language currently found in Rule 10 had already 
been codified.194
3.  Judicial Review 
 
Another method of oversight applicable to agency discretion but 
not the Court’s certiorari discretion is judicial review.195  Courts play 
an important role in reviewing many kinds of agency actions to ensure 
that the actions are not arbitrary and do not contravene statutory, 
regulatory, or constitutional principles.  A prominent example of this 
can be seen in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, in which the Court took the EPA to task for supplying improper 
reasons in denying a petition asking the EPA to regulate emissions 
that lead to global warming.196
Although there is a presumption of judicial review in the adminis-
trative law world,
 
197 not all agency action is judicially reviewable.  In-
deed, some agency decisions involving questions of resource allocation, 
such as nonenforcement decisions or refusals to reconsider, are pre-
sumptively exempted from judicial review.198
 
193
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 
  However, even when judi-
3, at ix (“Starting with the revision in 1995, the 
Court added a new element to its rule-making process:  making proposed rule changes 
available for public comment before finalizing them.”).   
194
Although Rule 10 has changed slightly through the years, the basic language 
found in the current rule can be traced back to a Court rule adopted just months after 
the passage of the Judges’ Bill of 1925.  See William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1925) (“The Court has 
thought it wise to indicate the lines along which its discretion will be exercised in 
granting certioraris, in Par. 5 of Rule 35 of the new Rules adopted by the Court in June 
last, to square with the new Act.”); see also Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1721 (“Although 
this rule has changed a bit over time . . . the basic thrust remains the same and the 
opening provision is nearly identical.”).   
195
See 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.2, at 1233 (“At least part of the solution to the 
problem of agency discretion must lie in judicial review of agency actions.”).   
196
549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007). 
197
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704 (2006) (providing for judicial review and enumerat-
ing the two instances in which the presumption favoring judicial review is rebuttable:  
when the “action is committed to agency discretion by law” or the “statutes preclude 
judicial review”); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (noting that both 
case law and the Administrative Procedure Act support the presumption of judicial re-
view of agency action).   
198
See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 280 (1987) (holding an 
agency denial of a request for reconsideration to be unreviewable); Heckler v. Chaney, 
470 U.S. 821, 828-31 (1985) (holding that agency nonenforcement decisions are pre-
sumptively nonreviewable).  See generally Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation 
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cial review is not available (for example, in the nonenforcement con-
text), political review nonetheless operates to check agency decisions.199
In the certiorari context, judicial review of the Court’s certiorari 
decisions by some other judicial body does not occur because the 
Court is the highest court in our country.
 
200
4.  Reason Giving 
  Nor are the Court’s certi-
orari decisions subject to any kind of meaningful review by Congress, 
the President, or members of the public, given that the Court does 
not explain its certiorari decisions and generally does not disclose in-
dividual Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions.  Hence, unlike agency 
decisions that generally are subject to judicial or political review, or 
both, neither judicial nor political review operates to constrain the 
Court’s certiorari decisions. 
Finally, certiorari is unconstrained by another procedural me-
chanism that plays a prominent role in administrative law:  a “reason-
giving” requirement.  In administrative law, reason-giving require-
ments appear in various places.  Section 555(e) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), for example, requires federal agencies to pro-
vide a “brief statement of the grounds for denial” when denying writ-
ten petitions or applications.201  Accordingly, when agencies deny peti-
tions asking them to engage in rulemaking or to initiate enforcement 
actions, the agency must give reasons for the denial.202  Similarly, when 
an agency engaged in informal adjudication denies a written applica-
tion or a petition made in connection with an agency proceeding, the 
agency must provide a “‘brief statement of the grounds for denial.’”203
 
in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (2008) (discussing confusion in the 
law concerning judicial review of agency inaction and resource allocation issues).   
 
199
Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  An Arbitrariness Ap-
proach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1658-60, 1714 -17 (2004) (recognizing that under the 
current state of the law, agency decisions not to act are subject to political rather than 
judicial control, but arguing that the law should be altered to allow room for courts to 
provide a check against arbitrary agency inaction).   
200
The Court itself could reconsider a certiorari decision, but such reconsidera-
tion rarely occurs.  See SUP. CT. R. 44.2 (allowing for petitions for rehearing of orders 
denying certiorari); GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 520 (noting that the majority of 
petitions for rehearing are filed “without any basis”).   
201
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006). 
202
Id.; see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 765 (1990) (noting that section 555(e) of the APA requires an 
agency to furnish a written explanation when it denies either a rulemaking petition or 
a petition for enforcement action).   
203
1 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 8.5, at 546 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)).   
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Section 706(2)(A) of the APA is the source of another reason-
giving requirement.  Section 706(2)(A), which subjects agency action 
to so-called “arbitrary and capricious review” by the federal courts,204 
has been read to require agencies to provide adequate reasons for 
their decisions.205  In the 1983 case Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of 
the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
Court explained this obligation as follows: “[T]he agency must ex-
amine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action including a rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.”206  Taking their cue from State Farm, agencies today 
routinely provide lengthy explanations for any actions that will be sub-
jected to arbitrariness review under § 706(2)(A).  For example, agen-
cies generally accompany their newly announced rules with detailed 
discussions of the relevant statute, any underlying data, explanations 
of the agency’s methods of reasoning, and responses to public com-
ments received by the agency.207
These reason-giving requirements mainly exist to ensure that 
agencies do not act in an arbitrary manner.
 
208  In fact, the permissibili-
ty of Congress’s decision to delegate broad legislative and adjudicatory 
discretion to agencies has, in many ways, hinged on the existence of 
the reason-giving requirement.  This requirement enables the courts, 
the political branches, and the public to examine the reasons support-
ing agency exercise of delegated discretion and to guard against arbi-
trariness.209






5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 Congress has left the Court free to make certiorari deci-
205
See Watts, supra note 171, at 14 (discussing the reason-giving requirement im-
posed by arbitrary and capricious review). 
206
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
207
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 7.4, at 441–50; Watts, supra note 171, at 14.  
208
Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 496 (2003) (describing how failing to 
demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking can be indicative of arbitrary action).   
209
See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch:  Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 423-25 (arguing that the heightened reason-giving requirement 
articulated in State Farm flows from separation of powers principles and responds to the 
broad delegations of legislative authority given to agencies); cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Sta-
tutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
452, 487 (1989) (noting that “the permissibility of delegating regulatory power” has 
hinged on the courts’ ability to review agency exercises of delegated power). 
210
Not all agency action is subject to a judicially enforceable reason-giving require-
ment.  Nonenforcement decisions, for example, are not subjected to any judicially en-
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sions without providing any reasons.  Nor has the Court chosen to lim-
it itself by imposing a reason-giving requirement on certiorari deci-
sions.211
It also distinguishes the Court’s certiorari powers from other areas 
in which the federal courts sometimes decline to exercise jurisdiction.  
As David Shapiro has described, historically the federal courts have en-
joyed the power to decline some jurisdiction given to them based on 
“principled” exercises of discretion.
  In most cases, no explanation is given.  This differentiates the 
Court’s certiorari process from agency actions that are subject to rea-
son-giving requirements, like denials of rulemaking petitions or de-
nials of petitions seeking enforcement actions. 
212  Shapiro explains that these de-
cisions generally involve the application of identifiable criteria that 
are “capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, 
evaluated by critics of the courts’ work, and reviewed by the legislative 
branch.”213  For example, various justiciability doctrines with pruden-
tial aspects like standing, ripeness, and the political-question doctrine 
enable the courts to make choices about which cases to hear.214
 
forced reason-giving requirement by virtue of the fact that there is “no law to apply.”  
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-32 (1984).  Such decisions are nonetheless still 
subject to other checks, such as political oversight, and perhaps to constitutional 
checks like the nondelegation doctrine.  See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, 
and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State:  Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
941, 989 (2000) (noting that decisions that are committed entirely to an agency’s dis-
cretion “would seem a prime target for nondelegation challenges”).  In addition, the 
APA helps facilitate political oversight of some nonenforcement decisions by requiring 
agencies to furnish written explanations when petitions for enforcement are denied.  5 
U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006); see also Levin, supra note 
  Simi-
larly, courts sometimes invoke abstention doctrines rooted in notions 
202, at 765-66 (fleshing out the re-
quirements of § 555(e)). 
211
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634, 637 (1995) 
(noting that when the Court makes certiorari decisions, “the conclusion stands alone, 
unsupported by reasons, justifications, or explanations”); see also supra notes 88-90 and 
accompanying text. 
212
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 578 (1985). 
213
Id.; see also id. at 589 (arguing that courts should enjoy some discretion in mat-
ters relating to federal jurisdiction but that “the process is one that calls not only for 
the continued involvement and articulated reasoning of trial and appellate courts, and 
for careful elaboration of their decisions, but also for continued oversight by the legis-
lative branch”).    
214
See id. at 552-55 (“[A] variety of cases reveal that the concepts falling under the 
heading of justiciability have a constitutional core, and that each concept has a pe-
numbra within which the Court sees itself as having discretion whether to exercise ju-
risdiction.”); see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 125 (noting the doctrines of standing and 
ripeness as examples of “available devices of ‘not doing’”).     
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of comity and federalism to avoid deciding cases that fall within the 
jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress.215
However, unlike judicial decisions that provide explanations as to 
why a court declines to grant prudential standing in a given case or 
why it decides to abstain from hearing a case due to federalism con-
cerns, contemporary exercise of certiorari does not fit within the type 
of “principled discretion” described by Shapiro.  Certiorari does not 
involve the application of identifiable criteria that are “capable of be-
ing articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by critics 
of the courts’ work, and reviewed by the legislative branch.”
 
216  Rather, 
as a result of Congress’s vague delegation to the Court, the Court’s 
discretion to “grant or deny review of cases within [its certiorari] ju-
risdiction is limited only by any guidelines that the Court chooses to 
impose on itself.”217
IV.  CHECKING THE COURT’S DISCRETION:  SOME POSSIBLE  
SOLUTIONS BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES 
 
In thinking about how the Court’s discretion might be reformed 
to help legitimate and constrain the Court’s certiorari process, various 
lessons drawn from administrative law are worthy of serious considera-
tion.  First, analogizing to the nondelegation doctrine, this Part con-
siders whether Congress should attempt to legislate an “intelligible 
principle” to guide the Court’s discretion.  Second, this Part examines 
whether the reason-giving requirement found in administrative law 
suggests the need to mandate greater disclosure in the certiorari 
process, either through a traditional reason-giving requirement or 
some other type of vote-disclosure requirement.  Third, this Part ana-
lyzes whether the Court—inspired by public-participation mechanisms 
used by administrative agencies—should become more willing to soli-
cit views on the cert-worthiness of cases from knowledgeable outsiders.  
Ultimately, this Part concludes that although it might be advisable for 
Congress to set forth an “intelligible principle” to guide certiorari de-
cisions in order to ward off any possible nondelegation-esque con-
 
215
See Shapiro, supra note 212, at 550-52.  Certain abstention doctrines have been 
criticized as inconsistent with separation of powers.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Absten-
tion, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984) 
(arguing that judge-made abstention doctrines used in the federalism context “could 
be characterized as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers”). 
216
Shapiro, supra note 212, at 578.   
217
Id. at 562.   
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cerns, a vote-disclosure requirement and increased opportunities for 
public participation offer the most promising and feasible means to 
improve accountability and to increase monitoring opportunities. 
A.  Legislating More Specific Standards 
The most obvious way to provide a check on the Court’s certiorari 
discretion would be for Congress to pass legislation that more specifi-
cally delineates the standards to be used in certiorari decisions.218  In 
other words, inspired by the nondelegation doctrine, Congress could 
pass legislation setting forth an “intelligible principle” to guide the 
Court’s discretion and to force the Court to consider specific factors 
when making certiorari decisions.219
As Congress has often done in the administrative context, it would 
be fairly simple for Congress to add a vague legislative standard—like 
“in the public interest” or “based on the public importance”—to the 
statutes that currently govern the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.  A sta-
tute in Maryland, for instance, provides that the state’s highest court 
should grant certiorari if the court determines that review is “desirable 
and in the public interest.”
 
220  Similarly, in 1975, Canada’s parliament 
gave Canada’s Supreme Court wide discretion to hear any case that 
the Court determines should be decided by “‘reason of its public im-
portance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed 
law and fact involved in such question.’”221
 
218
Alternatively, a constitutional amendment might enumerate factors to guide 
the Court’s power of discretionary review.  See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 5 
(“The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are 
of gravity or great public importance.”); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(e) (“In cases 
of public or great general interest, the Supreme Court may direct any court of appeals 
to certify its record to the Supreme Court, and may review and affirm, modify, or re-
verse the judgment of the court of appeals.”).  However, a constitutional amendment 
not only seems highly unlikely, but also might well be undesirable because it would 
take valuable flexibility away from Congress. 
 
219
An additional benefit of having Congress legislate more specific certiorari 
standards would be that litigants could be sanctioned for filing frivolous certiorari peti-
tions.  Estreicher and Sexton have suggested that the Supreme Court adopt a rule ana-
logous to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Estreicher & Sexton, supra 
note 98, at 801-02.  This might discourage the filing of frivolous petitions, allowing the 
Court to focus more closely on meritorious petitions.   
220
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2006).   
221
See ROY B. FLEMMING, TOURNAMENT OF APPEALS:  GRANTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IN CANADA 5 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 1975 reform gave Canada’s Supreme Court 
wide latitude, declaring that the decision to grant leave to appeal rested on the Court’s 
determination of the ‘public importance’ of issues raised by an application”) (quoting 
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40(1) (Can.)).   
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The addition of an elastic standard along these lines would likely 
be enough to provide the intelligible principle required by today’s 
weakened nondelegation doctrine.222  Indeed, adding such a standard 
might well be advisable to avoid any potential nondelegation con-
cerns.  In terms of constraining effects, however, such a “public im-
portance” standard might at most preclude a Justice who agrees that a 
case raises issues of great public importance from voting to deny the 
case for purely political or strategic reasons.  This standard might also 
preclude the Court from taking into account the quality of the lawyer-
ing when deciding whether to grant certiorari.  For the most part, 
however, it would seem that the addition of such a vague standard 
would do little to truly constrain the Court.223
The next question, accordingly, becomes whether it would be de-
sirable for Congress to legislate more specific, detailed certiorari stan-
dards that would have a greater constraining effect.
 
224
  In the past, 
some have argued that Congress should try to more carefully deli-
neate the kinds of cases that warrant certiorari review.  Herbert Wech-
sler, for example, argued in 1961 that “much would be gained if the 
governing statutes could be revised to play a larger part in the delinea-




See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (holding that a con-
gressional delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broad-
casting licensing for “public interest, convenience or necessity” was not unconstitu-
tionally vague); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574-77 (1939) 
(upholding a delegation to the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate milk prices in the 
“public interest”).   
  The fact that Congress has not done so—
223
Cf. State v. Tyson, 544 S.E.2d 444, 446 (Ga. 2001) (noting that a Georgia consti-
tutional provision giving the Georgia Supreme Court the power to review by certiorari 
cases in the Court of Appeals which are of “gravity or great public importance” places 
“no limit” on the court’s certiorari jurisdiction).   
224
Various state statutes might provide clues about how this could be done.  For 
example, a New Mexico statute provides that its supreme court has jurisdiction to re-
view via certiorari decisions of the court of appeals that (1) conflict with a decision of 
the supreme court; (2) conflict with a decision of the court of appeals; (3) involve a 
“significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United 
States”; or (4) involve an issue of “substantial public interest that should be deter-
mined by the supreme court.”  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14 B (1996).  The Supreme 
Court in New Mexico appears to pay attention to these four statutory factors—it has 
indicated that there are “four grounds” on which the court may grant certiorari.  Paule 
v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 117 P.3d 240, 246 (2005); see also N.M. R. APP. 
P. 12-502(C)(2) (requiring petitioners to state the basis for granting certiorari, includ-
ing whether any of the four statutory factors are present).   
225
HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 15 (1961).  
Estreicher and Sexton have made a related but different suggestion, arguing that the 
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despite mounting criticism of the certiorari process—seems to high-
light a fairly widely held assumption:  certiorari decisions are driven by 
a variety of factors, including the importance of the questions, the 
presence of a conflict in the lower courts, the need for further perco-
lation of the issues, and the need for clarification of the law.226  Hence, 
some level of flexibility seems desirable in certiorari decisions.227  Just 
as it has proven undesirable for Congress to speak with great specifici-
ty in many areas of the law that benefit from administrative flexibili-
ty,228 it would seem undesirable and perhaps quite difficult for Con-
gress to specify precisely the Court’s jurisdiction in a way that would 
preclude the Court from exercising some judgment about which cases 
should be heard.  After all, as Alexander Bickel and Doris Provine 
have described, the Court’s power not to hear cases is “part of the 
foundation of its institutional strength,” enabling the Court to “sides-
tep or postpone politically damaging disputes” or to “respond to 
changing litigation patterns.”229
Consistent with this notion that flexibility is valuable in the agenda-
setting process, most states have chosen to leave their highest courts 
 
 
Court itself should “develop more specific criteria for selecting cases for review” because 
“[t]he lack of meaningful criteria contributes to overgranting and overpetitioning, be-
cause litigants can never be certain whether their cases merit review.”  Estreicher & 
Sexton, supra note 98, at 800.   
226
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 233-310 (describing numerous factors that 
motivate the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?:  
The Supreme Court, The Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. 
L. REV. 967, 979-80 (2000) (noting that the Court sometimes takes the need for perco-
lation into account when deciding whether to grant certiorari).  But see REHNQUIST, 
supra note 38, at 235 (suggesting that “there are really only two or three factors in-
volved in the certiorari decision—conflict with other courts, general importance, and 
perception that the decision is wrong in light of Supreme Court precedent”). 
227 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 8206, supra note 153, at 21 (statement of Justice James 
C. McReynolds) (“It is almost impossible to define [the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction] 
with sufficient accuracy and certainty, and there ought to be some flexibility, and that 
flexibility is gained by means of the application for certiorari.”); Hearing on H.R. 10479, 
supra note 151, at 3 (statement of Chief Justice William H. Taft) (rejecting the idea 
that the Court’s jurisdiction be limited via careful congressional delineation because 
“it is a very difficult thing to include all the important cases, and it is a very difficult 
thing to exclude the unimportant cases”); Meador, supra note 122, at 660 (“Any [con-
gressional] effort to define by statute the types of cases to which the Court would be 
required to devote its limited resources would likely be either over-inclusive or under-
inclusive.”). 
228
See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 360, 368 
(2010) (“Legislatures often pass laws in broad terms to allow flexibility for future devel-
opments or to defer details to specialized executive agencies.”). 
229 PROVINE, supra note 22, at 72; see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 111-98 (describ-
ing “passive virtues” whereby courts might choose not to hear certain cases).   
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
46 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1 
with docket-setting discretion.230  In Kansas, for example, a statute lists 
various non-binding factors that the court should consider, such as 
the “general importance of the question presented” and the “exis-
tence of a conflict.”231  Similarly, in Minnesota, a statute delineates fac-
tors that its court “should” take into account when deciding whether 
to grant a petition for further review, including the importance of the 
question and whether a statute has been held unconstitutional,232 but 
these factors are merely “intended to be instructive” and are “neither 
mandatory nor exclusive.”233  Hawaii presents a similar situation.234
B.  Mandating Disclosure to Enable Greater Transparency and Monitoring 
  
This highlights the need to look to other more indirect forms of con-
straint in the certiorari context, just as other more indirect forms of 
constraint have been instrumental in controlling delegated discretion 
in the administrative law arena. 
An alternative means of reining in the Court’s discretion and 
enabling greater oversight and transparency would be for Congress to 
mandate—or for the Court to voluntarily impose upon itself—some 
kind of disclosure requirements.  Two possible disclosure require-
ments are considered here: (1) requiring the Court to explain the 
reasons behind certiorari decisions; and (2) requiring disclosure of 
the Justices’ certiorari votes.  Ultimately, this Section concludes that 
although a full-blown reason-giving requirement is unlikely to suc-
ceed, vote-disclosure requirements seem more feasible. 
 
230
See Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate 
Courts:  A Comparison of Florida’s System With Those of the Other States and the Federal System, 
45 FLA. L. REV. 21, 23 (1993) (noting that the “majority of state appellate court systems 
consist of two tiers:  a court of last resort, usually called the supreme court, and an in-
termediate appellate court, usually called the courts of appeals” and explaining that 
“[o]ne of the hallmarks of a two-tier appellate court system is discretionary supreme 
court review”).  One notable outlier is Florida.  In Florida, the state constitution sets 
forth specific criteria for discretionary review in a fairly restrictive manner.  See id. at 48 
(noting that “Florida’s system runs counter to prevailing practice, in that the supreme 
court’s constitutional categories are not guidelines, but are jurisdictional limitations”).   
231
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b) (2010).   
232
MINN. STAT. § 480A.10 (2010).   
233
MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117 comment (1983).  See generally Peter S. Popovich & 
Erin Leigh Miller, Obtaining Review in the Minnesota Supreme Court, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 
117, 131-32 (1990) (noting that in spite of the enumerated factors, “the granting of 
review is entirely discretionary”).   
234
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-59 (2010) (noting that the “acceptance or rejection 
of [a petition for review] shall be discretionary upon the supreme court”); State v. Bo-
losan, 890 P.2d 673, 676 n.5 (Haw. 1995) (noting that the legislative history makes 
clear that the court’s review is discretionary). 
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1.  Imposing a Reason-Giving Requirement 
Reason-giving requirements used in administrative law suggest 
one potential way of constraining certiorari.  Imposing a similar re-
quirement on the Court’s certiorari decisions would likely help ensure 
greater transparency, facilitate monitoring,235 and promote greater 
consistency.236
Without analogizing to administrative law, a few scholars—
including one writing shortly after the passage of the Judges’ Bill—




First, it might not be feasible for the Court to explain all of its cer-
tiorari decisions.  Various Justices have indicated that it would be 
plainly impractical for the Court to do so.  For example, in 1950 when 
the Court acted on approximately 1500 certiorari petitions per term, 
Justice Frankfurter explained that “it would not be feasible to give rea-
sons, however brief, for refusing to take” cases because the “time that 
would be required” would be “prohibitive.”
  This kind of reform, however, would likely face 
numerous legal and practical hurdles. 
238  Similarly, writing in 
1977 when the Court heard about 150 out of 4000 cases per term, 
then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that “there simply is not the time 
available to formulate statements of reasons why review is denied.”239  
Today, concerns about the time-intensive nature of explaining certi-
orari decisions would likely be even more acute given that the Court 
now receives approximately 8000 or 9000 petitions per term.240
While it might seem that issuing a brief order stating that a certain 
certiorari petition was denied because it is “splitless and factbound” or 




Cf. Shapiro, supra note 78, at 125 (“[M]ore transparency about cert decisions 
would encourage both public and internal discussion to focus more on the cert criteria 
themselves . . . .”).   
236
Cf. Schauer, supra note 211, at 641 (stating that “to provide a reason for a deci-
sion is to include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the deci-
sion itself” (emphasis omitted)).   
237
See Frank D. Moore, Right of Review by Certiorari to the Supreme Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 
307, 308 (1929) (suggesting that “the court should assign briefly its reasons for its 
denial”); see also Shapiro, supra note 78, at 125 (stating that the Court “publicly 
shar[ing] more information about the reasons it does or does not grant cert in particu-
lar cases” would result in greater transparency).       
238
Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., res-
pecting the denial of certiorari).  
239 William H. Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559, 
561 (1977). 
240
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.   
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would not take that much time, this may not be true.  For the most 
part, the Justices act on their own—without the benefit of collegial 
discussion—when deciding which cases merit discussion as a group, 
and even those certiorari petitions that are deemed worthy of group 
discussion receive fairly perfunctory discussion at conference.241  Given 
that certiorari decisions tend to be made individually, it seems likely 
that different Justices might have different reasons for granting or de-
nying certain petitions.242  Accordingly, it might be quite difficult for 
the Court to quickly formulate any kind of unified certiorari explana-
tions.243
Second, it might be argued that reason-giving requirements are 
most applicable to decisions that are driven by legal or technocratic 
factors and less applicable to highly discretionary decisions driven by 
strategic or political concerns.
 
244  This argument might appear to find 
some support in the notion that certain agency actions—namely, 
those that are “committed to agency discretion by law,” such as non-
enforcement decisions—are not subject to judicial review under the 
APA and hence are not subject to a judicially enforced reason-giving 
requirement.245
This argument against a reason-giving requirement in the certi-
orari context, however, is not fatal.  First, when a petition seeking a 
rulemaking proceeding or a petition seeking the initiation of an en-
forcement action is filed with an agency and is denied, the agency 
  Essentially, the argument is that if actions committed 
entirely to agency discretion (and not constrained by legal principles) 
are not subject to a reason-giving requirement, then the Supreme 
Court’s highly discretionary certiorari decisions should not be either. 
 
241
See Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 398-99 (describ-
ing how the Justices act individually, without collective discussion, during the certiorari 
process).   
242
See Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 918 (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (“[D]ifferent reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court 
in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.”).   
243
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 328 (noting that “since there are so many 
petitions denied each term and since there are so many differing, individual reasons 
that can underlie a denial in a particular case,” spelling out the reasons for certiorari 
decisions has become “impracticable”).   
244
Cf. Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1472, 
1494 (1989) (“I believe that the case selection process is, and should be, as much a po-
litical process as decisions on the merits.”); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1718-26 (suggest-
ing that certiorari decisions “frequently operate[] in the area of will and not law”). 
245
See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006) (rendering agency action “committed to agency 
discretion by law” nonreviewable); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-32 
(1985) (holding that nonenforcement decisions are generally not judicially reviewable 
because they are committed to agency discretion). 
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must provide a brief explanation for the denial.246  Thus, not all agen-
cy action committed to agency discretion is exempted from the rea-
son-giving requirement.247  Second, the main reason that some agency 
action committed to agency discretion is exempted from judicial re-
view (and hence by implication from a judicially enforced reason-
giving requirement) is not that it would be undesirable for agencies to 
explain the reasoning behind their discretionary actions.  Rather, 
agency action committed entirely to agency discretion is exempted 
from judicial review because there would be “no law” for the courts to 
apply in reviewing entirely discretionary decisions,248 and such deci-
sions are left to politically accountable actors.249
In the certiorari context, judicial review of the Court’s certiorari 
decisions is never conducted by any other judicial body, and so there 
would be no need for the Court to explain its certiorari decisions sole-
ly in legalistic terms capable of judicial review—other than perhaps 
the Court’s own desire to publicly disprove the notion that certiorari 
“frequently operates in the area of will and not law.”
 
250
Finally, if a reason-giving requirement were to be imposed, there 
is still the question of who would impose it.  It seems highly unlikely 
that the Justices would agree to voluntarily adopt such a requirement, 
especially in light of statements made by various Justices, such as Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Frankfurter, suggesting that the Justices 
believe that the Court simply does not have the time to explain its cer-
tiorari decisions.
  Furthermore, 
unlike in the administrative law world, where the availability of political 
review can help to compensate for the unavailability of judicial review 
in some circumstances (as in the nonenforcement setting), the Court’s 
certiorari decisions are shielded not only from judicial review but also 




See supra note 
 
210 and accompanying text.   
247
See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
248
See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945) (suggesting that this exception to the APA 
was meant to apply where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case 
there is no law to apply”).   
249
Cf. Bressman, supra note 199, at 1659 (“Consistent with the accountability 
theory, an agency’s failure to act should be subject to the scrutiny of politically accoun-
table officials.”).   
250
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1725.   
251
See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text; see also Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 
U.S. 940, 942-43 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (approving of 
Justice Frankfurter’s view that “[p]ractical considerations preclude” the Court from 
explaining its decisions (quoting Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari))).    
WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  11:46 AM 
50 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1 
So any reason-giving requirement would likely have to come from 
Congress.  Yet congressional attempts to impose a reason-giving re-
quirement on the Court would almost certainly elicit constitutional 
objections on separation of powers grounds.  Support for a separation 
of powers argument might appear to exist in Houston v. Williams, an 
1859 opinion written by Justice Stephen Field when he was on the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court.252  In Houston, Justice Field held that a Cali-
fornia statute, which required the state appellate courts to give rea-
sons for their decisions in writing, violated California’s constitution by 
improperly encroaching on the judiciary’s independence.253
 If the Legislature can require the reasons of our decisions to be 
stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in writing, and enforce 
their oral announcement, or prescribe the paper upon which they shall 
be written, and the ink which shall be used.  And yet no sane man will 
justify any such absurd pretension, but where is the limit to this power if 
its exercise in any particular be admitted? 
  Specifi-
cally, Justice Field wrote: 
 The truth is, no such power can exist in the Legislative Department, 
or be sanctioned by any Court which has the least respect for its own 
dignity and independence.  In its own sphere of duties, this Court can-
not be trammeled by any legislative restrictions.  Its constitutional duty is 
discharged by the rendition of decisions.
254
 Part of what seemed to bother Justice Field about the statute’s im-
position of an across-the-board reason-giving requirement is that it 
would needlessly take up the court’s time and resources.  “It is not 
every case,” Justice Field wrote, “which will justify the expenditure of 
time necessary to write an opinion.”
 
255
Other state courts, including the Supreme Court of Arkansas
 
256 
and the Supreme Court of Indiana,257
 
252
13 Cal. 24 (1859).   
 have embraced Justice Field’s 
reasoning in Houston.  In addition, Houston was recently cited by Judge 
253
Id. at 25.  For an analysis of what happened post-Houston and the history sur-
rounding a constitutional amendment that requires reasons for judicial opinions, see 
People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550-53 (Cal. 2006).  See also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 
(“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be 
in writing with reasons stated.”).   
254
Houston, 13 Cal. at 25. 
255
Id. at 26.   
256
See Vaughan v. Harp, 4 S.W. 751, 752-53 (Ark. 1887) (concluding that the legis-
lature has no authority to require the court to give written reasons for its decisions).   
257
See In re Griffiths, 20 N.E. 513, 513-14 (Ind. 1889) (holding unconstitutional a 
statutory provision requiring the Indiana Supreme Court to make a syllabus of each 
opinion).   
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Alex Kozinski in a statement to a congressional subcommittee caution-
ing Congress against intervening to address the issue of unpublished 
judicial decisions.258  Hence, it seems that if Congress were to impose a 
reason-giving requirement on the Court, those inclined to oppose the 
requirement might well look to the separation of powers arguments 
raised in Houston.259
However, any arguments along these lines might well be overcome 
simply by relying upon Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over 






Unpublished Judicial Decisions:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 16 (2002) (statement of 
Judge Alex Kozinski).   
  In light of the Constitution’s grant of power to 
Congress to make exceptions and to promulgate regulations govern-
ing the Court’s jurisdiction, it might be permissible for Congress to 
delegate to the Court the power to decide which cases it will hear sub-
ject to the caveat that the Court must explain its decisions to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction.  In other words, it might be possible—
consistent with separation of powers principles—to say that Congress’s 
decision to delegate its own legislative-like powers to the Court can 
have certain strings attached, such as the requirement that the Court 
explain itself in carrying out a role that Congress could have per-
259 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that “an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court” would be 
“patently unconstitutional”).    
260
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).  Interestingly, some state constitu-
tions explicitly give the states’ highest courts—not the state legislatures—the power to 
promulgate rules defining the courts’ appellate jurisdiction. For example, the Illinois 
Constitution, adopted in 1970, gives its supreme court the power to provide by court 
rule for appeals other than appeals as of right specified in the federal or state constitu-
tion.  ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 4(b)–(c).  Similarly, the Kentucky Constitution declares that 
in all but certain specified types of cases, “the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate 
jurisdiction as provided by its rules.”  KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b); see also IND. CONST. art. 
7, § 4 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and 
conditions as specified by rules except that appeals from a judgment imposing a sen-
tence of death shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court.”); MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4 
(“The supreme court shall have . . . appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the 
supreme court.”); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 30 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise appel-
late jurisdiction in all cases, criminal and civil, under such terms and conditions as it 
shall specify in rules not inconsistent with law.”).   
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formed itself.  After all, this is similar to what Congress routinely does 
when it hands legislative powers to administrative agencies.261
In any event, this constitutional question might well be mere aca-
demic sport because of a serious practical hurdle that would likely get 
in the way of any congressionally imposed reason-giving requirement: 
the Court might choose to thumb its nose at Congress by providing 
only very vague and general explanations in response to any such sta-
tute.  The nub of the problem is quis custodiet ipsos custodes:  who would 
guard the guardians?  The experiences of two states—Michigan and 
Maryland—corroborate this concern. 
 
A provision of the Michigan constitution mandates that the state’s 
supreme court provide “reasons for each denial of leave to appeal.”262  
This constitutional provision came about as a result of a 1961–1962 
constitutional convention through which Michigan created an inter-
mediate appellate court and modified the state supreme court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction, making it almost completely discretionary.263  As 
Maurice Kelman has detailed, “[p]revious Michigan constitutions di-
rected the supreme court to issue explanatory opinions for all deci-
sions,” but to the extent that the court enjoyed some discretionary ju-
risdiction prior to 1963, the court was not constitutionally required to 
offer a public explanation for the discretionary decision to deny re-
view.264  Thus, when significant expansion of the state supreme court’s 
discretionary jurisdiction was contemplated at the 1961–1962 constitu-
tional convention, three delegates offered the Donnelly Amendment, 
which proposed requiring the court to give “‘reasons for each denial 
of leave to appeal.’”265
 
261
See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006) (requiring that notices of agency denial of applica-
tions be accompanied by “a brief statement of the grounds of denial”); id. § 706(2)(A) 
(giving courts the power to review an agency decision for arbitrariness or capriciousness). 
  The delegate who proposed the amendment 
stated during the convention that she envisioned that this would simp-
ly require the court to provide a very short, concise statement of why 
262 See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Decisions of the supreme court, including all 
decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of 
the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to appeal.”).     
263
See Maurice Kelman, Case Selection by the Michigan Supreme Court:  The Numerology 
of Choice, 1992 DETROIT C. L. REV. 1, 7 (describing the Convention’s actions to “create[] 
an intermediate appellate court” and modify “the existing constitutional reference to the 
supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
264
Id. at 8-9.   
265
Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 6). 
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leave was denied, for example, because the case raises “merely a ques-
tion of fact.”266
Proponents of the Donnelly Amendment made various arguments 
in support of the proposed provision.
 
267  For example, one delegate 
argued that if the court considers a petition, “it must have arrived at a 
rational basis for its decision to deny appeal, and if it has a rational ba-
sis there is no reason why it ought not say so in writing to the parties 
who are appealing.”268  Others suggested that published reasons for 
denial would help provide guidance to litigants and attorneys about 
which cases warrant appeal.269  Various points were raised in response, 
including that requiring explanations would create an “insuperable 
work load” for the court.270
One delegate even quite presciently raised the possibility that no 
one would be able to enforce the constitutional requirement against 
the court: 
 
MR. TUBBS: [Assuming] that the answer given by the court would be 
something like this, “Appeal denied.  Reasons, none.”  Would that satisfy 
this amendment? 
. . . . 
MISS DONNELLY:  Mr. Tubbs, I suggest that you as a member of the bar 
are not serious in saying this. 
MR. TUBBS:  Let me ask you another question. . . . Now, this next opi-
nion says “Appeal denied.  Reasons, we do not like the brief filed for the 
appellant.” 
MISS DONNELLY:  I like to use my first reasoning again.  I don’t believe 
they will do that, and I don’t think you do, either. 
MR. TUBBS:  Third question:  suppose the supreme court issues an opi-
nion “Appeal denied.  No reasons.”  Who and what will enforce the con-
stitution? 
CHAIRMAN VANDUSEN:  Does the lady care to answer, Miss Donnelly? 
 
266
STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD 
1296 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1962) (statement of Del. Donnelly).   
267 See Kelman, supra note 263, at 9-10 (summarizing arguments made in favor of 
the amendment).   
268
STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD, 
supra note 266, at 1297 (statement of Del. Norris).   
269
Id. at 1295 (statement of Del. Donnelly); id. at 1297 (statement of Del. Ford).   
270
Id. at 1302 (statement of Del. Prettie); see also Kelman, supra note 263, at 10 
(summarizing other arguments made by critics of the amendment, including that a 
statement of reasons for denial would blur the line between the merits of a case and 
discretionary decisions about whether to exercise jurisdiction).    
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MISS DONNELLY:  I think you know the answer, Mr. Tubbs.  Nothing 
will.  But if the supreme court will so violate that part of the constitution, 
then we have a very, very serious problem in this state.
271
 Just as Delegate Tubbs’ questions predicted,
 
272 the Donnelly 
Amendment—after going into effect273—failed to yield meaningful 
explanations.  In fact, in Michigan, “[a]ll that is filed in the clerk’s of-
fice and sent to the litigants is a standard form order filled in with the 
title and docket number of the case” and accompanied by boilerplate 
language stating that the court is “‘not persuaded that the question(s) 
presented should be reviewed.’”274  Hence, as Kelman has pointed out 
in an article criticizing the Michigan court, the court is effectively ignor-
ing the requirement set forth in the state’s constitution.275
Maryland’s experience with a reason-giving requirement is quite 
similar.  A Maryland state statute provides that its highest court (the 
Maryland Court of Appeals), which can grant review when the court 
determines it is “desirable and in the public interest,” shall provide 
the “reasons for the denial of the writ . . . in writing.”
 
276  As in Michi-
gan, the requirement has not resulted in illuminating explanations of 
certiorari denials.  Rather, the Court of Appeals will generally issue 
nothing more than formulaic language to the effect that the petition 
is “denied as there has been no showing that review by certiorari is de-
sirable and in the public interest.”277
 
271
STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD, 
supra note 
 
266, at 1304 (statements of Del. Tubbs and Del. Donnelly). 
272
See Kelman, supra note 263, at 12 (“The palm for prescience goes to Mr. Tubbs, 
not Ms. Donnelly.”).    
273
MICH. CONST. art VI, § 6. 
274
Kelman, supra note 263, at 12; see also, e.g., Morrill v. St. Joseph Cnty. Road 
Comm., 699 N.W.2d 698, 698 (Mich. 2005) (denying application for leave to appeal 
“because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this 
court”).  This is the case despite the existence of a court rule suggesting that reasons 
will be given.  See MICH. CT. R. 7.321 (“The reasons for denying leave to appeal, re-
quired by Const 1963, art 6, § 6 and filed in the clerk’s office, are not to be published, 
and are not to be regarded as precedent.”).    
275
Kelman, supra note 263, at 12-13 (stating that the process “is utterly uninforma-
tive and a far cry from the statement of reasons the Constitutional Convention directed 
the court to give”). 
276
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2006).   
277
E.g., Johnson v. Baker, 562 A.2d 151 (Md. 1989); Smith v. Graymar Co., 468 
A.2d 624 (Md. 1983); Taylor v. Benjamin, 468 A.2d 624 (Md. 1983); Moats v. Estate of 
Pumphrey, 366 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1976); see also William L. Reynolds, II, The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland:  Roles, Work and Performance, 37 MD. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977) (noting that 
the standard wording of an order denying certiorari simply provides in an unrevealing 
manner that “there has been no showing that review by certiorari is desirable and in 
the public interest”); cf. William J. Murphy & John J. Connolly, Petitions for Certiorari—
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Perhaps it could be argued that the U.S. Supreme Court would be 
less able than Maryland and Michigan state courts to effectively ignore 
a reason-giving requirement because the Court stands at the pinnacle 
of our nation’s legal system and faces intense public scrutiny through 
a variety of avenues, including legal blogs that might keep the Court 
honest.278  However, further evidence suggesting that a congressionally 
mandated reason-giving requirement might face serious hurdles can 
be found by looking at the Court’s reactions to past congressional at-
tempts to mandate that the Court hear certain cases.  Prior to the 
1988 Act,279 which eliminated most of the Court’s mandatory jurisdic-
tion, the Court disposed of many mandatory appeals summarily with-
out full briefing and oral argument and without issuing a full opi-
nion.280  The Court effectively thwarted Congress’s intent by taking 
summary action before argument, such as summary affirmances and 
summary dismissals.281
In short, with no means of enforcing a reason-giving requirement 
against the Court, the success of any such requirement would likely 
depend on the receptiveness of the Court.  Given that it seems quite 
unlikely that the Court would look kindly upon a congressional 
mandate or would voluntarily impose such a requirement on itself, 
other mechanisms for constraining the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction 
warrant consideration. 
 
2.  Requiring Disclosure of Certiorari Votes 
Rather than importing administrative law’s reason-giving re-
quirement wholesale into the certiorari context, one less intrusive and 
much more promising means of forcing an alternative kind of disclo-
sure might simply be to require publication of the Court’s votes on 
certiorari petitions.282
 
View From the Bar, in APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER:  STATE AND 
FEDERAL 351 (Paul Mark Sandler & Andrew D. Levy eds., 3d ed. 2007) (noting that the 
judges on the Court of Appeals “rarely publish specific reasons why certiorari was either 
granted or denied in particular cases”). 
  This could be a backdoor way of obtaining rea-
278
See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) 
(covering the Supreme Court, often with multiple posts per day).   
279
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
280
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 364 (noting that “[i]n the 1981 and 1982 
Terms, for example, 85 percent and 92 percent of the appeals from state courts, and 45 
percent and 40 percent of the appeals from federal courts” were summarily dismissed).   
281
Id.   
282
The possibility of calling for vote disclosure was mentioned by Doris Provine in 
1980.  See PROVINE, supra note 22, at 177 (“Interested persons should have access to 
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sons for some of the Court’s certiorari decisions since the Justices—
knowing that their certiorari votes would be made public and fearing 
that their votes could be misread as a reflection on the merits of the 
case—might be more inclined to choose on their own initiative to ex-
plain their certiorari votes in certain cases.283
A vote-disclosure requirement also might be a way of encouraging 
the Justices to rely less on their law clerks for petition screening and to 
pay more careful attention to certiorari petitions.
  For example, a Justice 
might opt to write an explanation of a vote to deny a petition by not-
ing that jurisdictional defects in the petition precluded a vote to grant 
but that the substantive issues raised in the petition warrant review in 
a future case, thereby signaling to the outside world that the Justice is 
interested in the merits of the issue raised. 
284
Perhaps even more importantly, a vote-disclosure requirement 
could be used to facilitate public oversight and political monitoring, 
just as transparency in administrative decisionmaking facilitates politi-
cal control and oversight.  Specifically, Congress could use vote-
disclosure information to consider whether (and how) to revise the 
Court’s jurisdictional statutes.
  After all, the Jus-
tices’ own names would be publicly attached to certiorari decisions at 
the time the decisions are made rather than (as is the case under our 
current system) years or decades after the fact when a retired col-
leagues’ papers are made public.  In addition, publication of the dis-
cuss list might help to cut down on frivolous filings.  An attorney 
might be reluctant to recommend that a client spend money on a cer-
tiorari petition if the attorney knew that the client would ultimately 
learn that no Justice on the Court voted to grant certiorari. 
285
 
voting data that will enable them to piece together the considerations the Court takes 
into account in deciding cases.”).   
  In addition, both the President and 
283
See id. (“Publication of votes might indeed encourage some justices to write 
opinions justifying their case-selection votes, but this is an insufficient argument 
against any disclosure at any time.”); cf. Steve Albert, The Ninth Circuit’s Secret Ballot:  
Some Judges Want to Reconsider the Private Nature of Votes for En Banc Review, RECORDER 
(S.F.), Mar. 3, 1995, at 1 (noting that some judges in the Ninth Circuit worry that if en 
banc votes were publicly revealed, “their votes could be misread as reflecting their 
judgments on the merits of a case”).     
284
Cf. Shapiro, supra note 78, at 116-29 (discussing concerns about the role that 
clerks play in the certiorari process).   
285
Congress could receive assistance in analyzing the “real-time” voting data from 
scholars who already mine the papers of retired Justices to try to piece together clues 
about how the Court has handled certiorari petitions in the past.  See, e.g., Cordray & 
Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection, supra note 7, at 29 (“By comparing the 
Justices’ voting alignments on certiorari to their voting alignments on the merits in 
granted cases, we saw strong evidence that there is a significant merits-oriented com-
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the Senate could use the information to put the spotlight on certiorari 
in the confirmation process and to take nominees’ views on certiorari 
into account when nominating and confirming Justices.286
Two possible means of requiring vote disclosure are considered 
here:  (a) requiring disclosure of those certiorari petitions that fail to 
make the Court’s discuss list; and (b) requiring disclosure of the Jus-
tices’ votes on all other certiorari petitions.  Whether imposed by 
Congress or by the Court itself, these kinds of vote-disclosure re-
quirements offer a promising mechanism to increase transparency 
and improve public monitoring of the Court. 
 
a.  Votes on Petitions That Fail to Make the Discuss List 
Requiring public disclosure of those certiorari petitions that are 
automatically denied without discussion would be an easy way to shed 
some light on the certiorari process and enable greater monitoring.  
Unlike a reason-giving requirement, such disclosure would not impose 
a time-consuming burden on the Justices.  Since the Court already in-
ternally tracks which cases make the discuss list and which do not, it 
 
ponent in the Justices’ decisionmaking on certiorari.”); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and 
the Supreme Court Agenda:  An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 766 (2001) (find-
ing that over half of the cases eliminated through the certiorari process either raised a 
“frivolous” question, did not have an opinion on the merits from the court immediately 
below the Supreme Court, or involved a pro se petitioner); Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda 
Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases:  Lessons from the Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 889, 
892 (2004) (investigating Justice Blackmun’s papers to determine “the factors that ex-
plain the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari to federal tax controversies”).   
286
In recent confirmation proceedings, certiorari has surfaced but generally has 
played only a bit part.  For example, Justice Sonia Sotomayor was asked whether she 
would join the cert pool and whether she would have granted certiorari in a particular 
case that the Court denied.  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia 
Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 438, 440 (2009).  In addition, Justice Elena 
Kagan was asked whether she would grant certiorari in specific cases, and she was 
asked what factors would motivate her certiorari grants.  See The Nomination of Elena Ka-
gan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 78, 248-50 (2010).  Justice Kagan was also asked 
about a certiorari memo she wrote as a law clerk to Justice Marshall in which she cau-
tioned the Justice against granting in the case because “the Court might create some 
very bad law on abortion and/or prisoners’ rights.”  Id. at 107.  Chief Justice John Ro-
berts was asked how he would decide “which cases will make the cut and will be heard 
by the Supreme Court” and what would guide his “complete discretion to choose 
which cases to hear.”  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
336 (2005).  Justice Alito was asked whether he would join the cert pool.  Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 394-95 (2006).   
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would be quite simple for the Court to release a list of certiorari peti-
tions that were denied without receiving conference discussion.  If the 
Court were to disclose all cases that fail to make the discuss list, it 
would, by negative inference, also disclose those cases that did make 
the discuss list. 
Certainly, the mere disclosure of those petitions that fail to make 
the discuss list would not enable the outside world to learn why certain 
cases did or did not warrant discussion, but such disclosure would re-
veal—in a minimally intrusive manner—which petitions yielded dis-
cussion and which did not, as well as precisely how many petitions fail 
to yield any conference discussion in a given year.  Accordingly, Court 
watchers and Congress alike would gain valuable information about 
how the Court is exercising its discretion. 
Such a disclosure requirement would not be unheard of in the 
judicial realm, but rather finds an analog in various federal courts of 
appeals’ en banc procedures.287  Much like petitions for certiorari filed 
with the U.S. Supreme Court, petitions for rehearing en banc filed 
with the courts of appeals are often denied, and rarely even result in a 
judge requesting a vote on the petition.288  Notably, three different cir-
cuit courts have chosen to adopt rules or internal procedures that 
provide that orders denying petitions for rehearing en banc shall note 
when no member of the circuit court requests a poll on the petition.  
In the Fourth Circuit, for example, if no judge requests a poll on a pe-
tition for rehearing en banc, then “the panel’s order on a petition for 
rehearing will bear the notation that no member of the Court re-
quested a poll.”289  Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, when no judge makes 
a request for a poll, “the panel’s order denying the petition for re-
hearing en banc must show no poll was requested.”290
 
287
Petitions for rehearing en banc filed in the courts of appeals are similar to peti-
tions for certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in that both are discretionary 
instead of mandatory.  However, they are also quite different in that a court of appeals 
that decides to hear a case en banc has already heard the case, whereas a petition for 
certiorari requests the Supreme Court to review the case for the first time.  And fur-
ther, when the Supreme Court is faced with a petition for certiorari on appeal from a 
state court, the Supreme Court is deciding whether any federal judges shall exercise 
the federal judicial power in the case at all.   
  In the Eleventh 
288
See, e.g., Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit, 68 TENN. L. 
REV. 771, 780 (2001) (discussing the statistical improbability of obtaining en banc re-
view in the Sixth Circuit). 
289
4TH CIR. R. 35(b).   
290
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, RULES AND INTERNAL OPERAT-
ING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
34 -36 (2011), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/5thCir-IOP.pdf. 
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Circuit, if no poll is requested, then “the panel must enter an order 
denying the petition for rehearing en banc showing no poll was re-
quested by any judge of the court in regular active service.”291
b.  Votes on All Petitions or All Denied Petitions 
  Hence, 
these three circuits’ en banc rules establish some judicial receptive-
ness to the notion of vote disclosure and suggest a model that could be 
very useful in thinking about how to mandate disclosure of the Court’s 
discuss list. 
Alternatively, the Court could be required to disclose the Justices’ 
votes on more than just the subset of petitions that fail to make the 
discuss list.  This could be done by either requiring the Justices to dis-
close their votes on all denied petitions (not just those petitions that are 
automatically denied because they fail to make the discuss list), or by 
requiring the Justices to disclose their votes on all petitions regardless 
of whether the petition is granted or denied.  A major advantage of 
vote disclosure on all petitions is that it would be easier for those ex-
ternal to the Court, including Congress, to monitor the Court’s certi-
orari decisions and to piece together possible voting patterns.  One 
possible disadvantage, however, of disclosing votes on all petitions 
might be that if certiorari votes were disclosed at the time certiorari 
was granted, then litigants in granted cases might try to tailor their 
merits arguments to certain Justices based on a “tea leaf” reading of 
the certiorari votes.292  This problem could be avoided, however, by 
waiting to disclose certiorari votes on granted petitions until the case 
is decided on the merits.293
At the en banc level, the Fourth Circuit’s local rules provide a use-
ful example of requiring vote disclosure for all denials.  In the Fourth 
Circuit, not only will an order on a petition for rehearing that fails to 
yield a request for a poll “bear the notation that no member of the 
  Alternatively, a vote-disclosure requirement 
could be limited to denied petitions. 
 
291
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES No. 5, at 147 (2011), available at 
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/BlueAUG11.pdf. 
292
Another potential disadvantage of requiring the Justices to disclose their votes 
on petitions that make the discuss list is that such a requirement might disincentivize 
the Justices from putting certiorari petitions on the discuss list in the first place.  This 
could militate in favor of only requiring disclosure of those cases that fail to make the 
discuss list.   
293
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1482 n.18 (questioning whether, if Pro-
vine’s suggestion of vote disclosure were adopted, disclosure of votes on a grant of cer-
tiorari should “be deferred until the case has been disposed of”).  
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Court requested a poll,”294 but also if a poll is requested on a petition 
and rehearing en banc is denied, then “the order will reflect the vote 
of each participating judge.”295
Some other useful examples can be found at the state level.  In 
Arizona, for example, Rule 23(h) of Arizona’s Rules of Civil Appellate 
Procedure provides:  “If the Supreme Court denied review, its order 




  This rule, accordingly, embraces the notion of vote 
disclosure in cases where review is denied.297  Similarly, in California, a 
court rule also calls for vote disclosure on petitions for review, but un-
like the rule in Arizona, it focuses on disclosure of votes in cases where 
review is granted.  Specifically, this rule provides:  “An order granting 
review must be signed by at least four justices; an order denying review 
may be signed by the Chief Justice alone.”298
 
294
4TH CIR. R. 35(b).   
  Thus, if one wants to 
learn which members of the California Supreme Court voted to grant 
review in a particular granted case, one need only look to the court’s 
295
Id.  This differs from the en banc rules of some other circuits that allow (but do 
not require) judges to disclose their en banc votes in certain circumstances.  See U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES 57 (2011), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/ 
content/Court+Rules+and+Operating+Procedures (follow “Handbook of Practice and 
Internal Procedures” hyperlink) (“An order granting rehearing en banc does not indi-
cate the names of the judges who voted against rehearing, but an order denying re-
hearing en banc does indicate the names of the judges who voted to grant rehearing 
en banc, if they wish.” (emphasis omitted));  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ch. 9.5.8, at 13 (2002), available at http:// 
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf (“If there is a dissent from the denial of 
rehearing and no dissenting opinion is filed, a notation will be added to the dispositive 
order, at the affirmative request of the dissenting judge, that ‘Judge ___ would grant 
rehearing by the court en banc.’  Any active judge may file an opinion sur denial of the 
petition and direct its publication.”).  The Fourth Circuit rule also stands in sharp con-
trast to the Ninth Circuit’s procedures, which expressly provide that orders denying or 
granting en banc consideration will not specify the vote tally.  See 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 to 35-
3 advisory committee note 2. 
296
ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 23(h).  
297
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, No. CR-09-0256-PR, 2010 Ariz. LEXIS 8 (Ariz. Feb. 4, 
2010) (denying petition for review and noting that “Chief Justice Berch and Justice 
Bales voted to grant review on issue 2”), denying review to 207 P.3d 804 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2009); State v. Gum, No. CR-07-0176-PR, 2007 Ariz. LEXIS 114 (Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007) 
(denying review but noting that “Justice Hurwitz voted to grant review”), denying review 
to 153 P.3d 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Performance Funding, L.L.C. v. Ariz. Pipe Trade 
Trust Funds, No. CV-02-0240-PR, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 215 (Ariz. Dec. 4, 2002) (denying 
review but noting that “Chief Justice Jones voted to grant review”), denying review to 49 
P.3d 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).  
298
CAL. R. CT. 8.512(d)(1).     
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minutes,299 which indicate which justices voted to grant the petition.300  
The justices in California are also free to note their votes in cases that 
are denied review, but court rules do not mandate vote disclosure in 
the case of denials as opposed to grants.301
The fact that some federal and state courts have chosen to prom-
ulgate court rules imposing vote-disclosure requirements suggests that 
it might not be all that unrealistic to believe that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would be willing to do so as well.  Alternatively, a vote-disclosure 
requirement could come from Congress.  Congressional action along 
these lines might raise separation of powers questions similar to those 
that would be raised if Congress considered imposing a traditional 
reason-giving requirement on the Court.  However, as discussed 
above, any such separation of powers concerns might be surmounta-
ble in light of Article III’s textual grant of power to Congress to make 
regulations governing the Court’s jurisdiction.
 
302  Furthermore, any 
concerns that might flow from separation of powers principles would 
seem to be less significant in the vote-disclosure context than in the 
traditional reason-giving context.  Unlike a full-blown reason-giving 
requirement, vote disclosure would not require significant time or re-
sources and hence could not as easily be said to unduly interfere with 
the Court’s ability to carry out its judicial functions.303
 
299
See Lawrence Baum, Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California Supreme 
Court:  Patterns in Court and Individual Behavior, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 713, 716 (1976).   
  Nonetheless, 
even if Congress could impose a vote-disclosure requirement on the 
Court without violating separation of powers principles, it would seem 
preferable to have the Court voluntarily impose the requirement on 
itself in order to maximize judicial compliance with the requirement. 
300
California makes the court’s meeting minutes available online.  Minutes:  Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeal, CAL. CTS., http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cgibin/ 
minutes.cgi (select “Supreme Court” from the dropdown menu) (last visited Oct. 15, 
2011).  
301
SUPREME COURT OF CAL., THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA pt. IV.I (2007), 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2007_Supreme_Court_Booklet.pdf 
(“In any case in which the petition, application, or motion is denied, a justice may re-
quest that his or her vote be recorded in the court minutes.”). 
302
See supra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.   
303
See Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859) (striking down a reason-giving 
requirement in part because the requirement would needlessly take up the court’s 
time and resources).  
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C.  Enabling Greater Public Participation 
One final means of reforming the Court’s certiorari discretion 
would seek to enable greater public participation in the certiorari 
process by analogizing to public participation mechanisms that exist 
in the administrative law world.  The goal certainly would not be to 
move the certiorari process to a full-blown notice-and-comment rule-
making model, which is cumbersome and can take years to com-
plete.304  Rather, the goal would be to increase the opportunity for 
participation by knowledgeable outsiders through greater invited and 
uninvited amicus curiae participation and through greater use of “cer-
tification,” which allows the lower federal courts to certify questions of 
law to the Court for resolution.305
Currently, the primary sources that the Court looks to when mak-
ing certiorari decisions are the written briefs filed by the petitioner 




Moreover, encouraging greater public participation could help 
reduce the risk of “capture” of the Court by the expert Supreme Court 
bar.
  Certiorari decisions are thus based primarily on 
information presented to the Court in the parties’ briefs through a 
fairly closed judicial process.  This highlights how Congress has re-
moved important questions about what kinds of cases the Court 
should hear from the usual legislative arena where public participa-
tion and open deliberation can easily occur.  It also highlights how the 
Court must make certiorari decisions based on limited information 
regarding the importance of the case.  Enabling greater participation 
by knowledgeable outsiders in the certiorari process could help to 




See Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking:  The Next Step in Regulatory Innovation at 
the Food and Drug Administration?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 431 (2010) (noting that 
notice-and-comment rulemaking can take several years to complete). 
  As Richard Lazarus has demonstrated, expert Supreme Court 
305
See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006) (giving the Court jurisdiction to review cases in the 
court of appeals via certification).   
306
Respondents do not always provide the Court with a written brief opposing cer-
tiorari.  See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 508 (noting that respondents can choose 
to “waive the right to oppose a petition”).   
307
See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 90 (describing the increasing influence of the Su-
preme Court bar); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Su-
preme Court:  Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1562-64 
(2008) (highlighting the influence of the Supreme Court bar and urging reform from 
both the bar and the Court); Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters:  The Rise of a Su-
preme Court Bar and Its Effect on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 203 (2007) 
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advocates were responsible for 53.8% of the petitions granted plenary 
review during the 2007 Term—a number that has steadily increased 
from only 5.8% of plenary grants in the 1980 Term.308  These statistics, 
according to Lazarus, raise “the very real possibility that the Court’s 
plenary docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of expert 
Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private bar” who 
“know best how to influence the decisionmaking of the Justices at the 
jurisdictional stage.”309
1.  Invited Amici Briefs 
 
One potential way of increasing the opportunity for broader pub-
lic participation at the certiorari stage involves encouraging “the Jus-
tices to be more willing at the jurisdictional stage to seek input from 
those outside the Court who are knowledgeable about the issues 
raised by a pending petition.”310  It is well established that the Court 
can reach out and invite the views of those who are not involved in the 
case at the certiorari stage,311 but to date the Court has used this power 
almost exclusively to invite the views of the Solicitor General (“SG”) 
through what is known as a “CVSG”—an order that “calls for the views 
of the Solicitor General.”312
For example, the Court might invite the views of states at the cer-
tiorari stage, or might invite the views of advocacy organizations with 
expertise relating to the issues raised by the petition, such as the ACLU 
or the AFL-CIO.  Since the SG’s office generally presents the views of 
the executive branch, the Court might also invite the views of mem-
bers of the legislative branch in certain cases.  Unlike the executive 
branch, which is headed unilaterally by the President, Congress—with 
  There is room, then, for the Court to 
reach out to others at the certiorari stage. 
 
(“[C]ertain experienced practitioners enjoy disproportionate success in crossing the 
Court’s [certiorari] threshold.”).    
308
Lazarus, supra note 11, at 90.     
309
Id. at 89. 
310
Id. at 96. 
311
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 516-17 (noting that the Court typically 
reaches out for the opinion of the United States or a state).  See generally David C. 
Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Peti-
tion Procedures:  The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 242 (2009) (discussing the Court’s ability to invite the views 
of those outside the Court at the certiorari stage). 
312
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 516-17 & n.178; cf. John F. Duffy, The Fed-
eral Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 525 (2010) 
(noting that CVSGs have been used by the Court at the certiorari stage to invite the 
Solicitor General’s views for about a half century now).   
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its many members—might well face institutional difficulties if trying to 
formulate a unified, institutional response to an invitation.313
In terms of invitations to nongovernmental amici, the Justices 
might hesitate because of concerns about imposing a financial burden 
on the invited amici.  However, these concerns could be significantly 
reduced if the Court allowed invited amici to forego printing their 
briefs in booklet format and instead allowed them to file on standard-
sized paper, which the Court already allows in forma pauperis filers to 
do.
  Howev-
er, groups of Congressmen or subcommittees might be able to come 
together to bring a legislative perspective to the table, even if it fell 
short of representing the views of the legislative branch as a whole. 
314
2.  Uninvited Amici Briefs 
  Alternatively, the Court could cover the printing costs of invited 
amici. 
Besides relying solely upon additional invited amicus briefs to in-
crease public participation in the certiorari process, another means of 
enabling greater input would be to encourage the increased filing of 
uninvited amicus briefs by interested organizations.  Court rules allow 
interested organizations or individuals to file amicus curiae briefs ei-
ther supporting or opposing certiorari if the brief is accompanied by 
the written consent of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file.315  
Although certiorari-stage amicus briefs are on the rise,316 most certi-
orari petitions today are unaccompanied by amicus briefs.317
 
313
Cf., e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929 n.4 (1983) (noting that briefs were 
filed by the Senate and the House of Representatives in the case but that “[n]ine 
Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the position taken in the 
briefs” and hence “filed a brief amici curiae”).   
  Thus, 
the increased filing of amicus briefs by interested and knowledgeable 
organizations might well serve as a useful means of boosting broader 
public participation and deliberation in the certiorari process and 
314
See SUP. CT. R. 39.3 (providing an exception to Rule 33.2, which allows in forma 
pauperis filers to file on 8-1/2 by 11-inch paper, except when expressly provided).  
Electronic filing might also be an option to consider.  
315
SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a); see also SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (“An amicus curiae brief that brings 
to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the 
parties may be of considerable help to the Court.”).   
316
See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, To Get on the Argument Docket, It Helps to Have 
Friends, NAT’L L.J. ( July 28, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinter 
FriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202463990959&slreturn=1.   
317
See id. (noting that the Court still generally makes certiorari decisions based 
only on filings from the petitioner and the respondent).   
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bringing more diverse views to the table,318 as well as signaling public 
interest in certain cases.319
In thinking about roadblocks that might stand in the way of the 
increased use of uninvited amicus briefs, one significant issue surfaces: 
when certiorari petitions are filed, they are not made readily accessi-
ble to the public.  The Court does not post pending certiorari peti-
tions on the Court’s website.  Those who are interested in monitoring 
certiorari petitions generally must visit the Supreme Court in Wash-
ington, D.C.; use a subscription service like Westlaw, which now in-
cludes a certiorari petition database; or closely monitor legal blogs, 
such as SCOTUSblog’s “Petitions to Watch” list.
 
320  Hence, if uninvited 
amicus briefs are to come from more than just the usual suspects at 
the certiorari stage, then the Court might need to consider publicly 
disseminating pending certiorari petitions free of charge on its web-
site.  Although this might sound like a difficult task, the creation of 
websites like Regulations.gov, which was designed to increase transpa-
rency in the administrative law world,321 suggests that posting all pend-
ing certiorari petitions would be logistically feasible and that it might 
fit within the government’s current focus on transparency.322  Such a 
move might also fit nicely with recent steps the Court has taken to 
make itself more publicly accessible, such as its decision in 2010 to 
publicly release audio transcripts from oral arguments the same week 
as the argument via the Court’s website.323
 
318
See, e.g., Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts?  Peti-
tions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 
377-84 (2010) (studying the role that citizen petitions and litigation play in driving the 
environmental regulatory agenda and concluding that public participation might help 
improve the performance of environmental agencies by collecting diffuse information 
about environmental conditions).   
 
319
Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 783 (2000) (“Political scientists have long 
perceived an analogy between interest groups lobbying legislatures and interest groups 
seeking to influence judicial decisions through the filing of amicus briefs.”). 
320 See, e.g., Christa Culver, Petitions to Watch:  Conference of September 26, 2011, SCO-
TUSBLOG (Sept. 2, 2011, 7:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/petitions-to-
watch-conference-of-september-26-2011-2/.   
321
See REGULATIONS.GOV, supra note 187 (providing an online forum for citizens 
to search, view, and comment on federal regulations).    
322
See Transparency and Open Government:  Memorandum for the Heads of Ex-
ecutive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (explain-
ing President Obama’s goal of governmental transparency within executive depart-
ments and agencies).   
323
See Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 28, 2010), available 
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName= 
pr_09-28-10.html (“Beginning with October Term 2010, the audio recordings of all 
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Alternatively, the Court might seek to increase amicus participa-
tion at the certiorari stage by publicly releasing the Court’s discuss list 
a certain number of weeks prior to voting on the petitions to enable 
interested amici to file briefs addressing whether certiorari should be 
granted.  This is somewhat analogous to the practice of some adminis-
trative agencies issuing advanced notices of proposed rulemaking or 
soliciting dialogue from the public prior to engaging in rulemaking or 
deciding petitions seeking rulemaking.324
Of course, even if the Court did make certiorari-stage filings more 
readily accessible or disseminate its discuss list in advance to enable 
public response, additional hurdles still might stand in the way of 
turning uninvited amicus briefs into a successful tool for meaningful 
public participation.  For example, the Court might not listen to the 
uninvited amici.  This concern seems quite plausible given that—
unlike in the administrative law context where the threat of judicial 
review motivates agencies to respond in a reasoned manner to all sig-
nificant comments—there would be no judicial enforcement mechan-
ism to force the Court to take the amici views into account.  Nonethe-
less, since the Court lacks the power to enforce its own judgments and 
is in some ways beholden to public opinion,
 
325 the Court might well 
have an incentive to listen closely to meaningful comments filed by 
amici about the importance of petitions,326 particularly in today’s in-
terconnected world in which legal blogs increasingly keep tabs on the 
Court and enable public discussion of the Court’s actions.327
In addition, questions might arise concerning whether any unin-
vited amici would predominantly represent certain interest groups 
rather than diverse public views.  Similar concerns have arisen in tradi-
tional notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings.  Although sever-
al scholars have concluded that interest groups dominate the adminis-
 
 
oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court of the United States will be available free 
to the public on the Court’s Web site, www.supremecourt.gov, at the end of each ar-
gument week.”).   
324
See generally Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and 
Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1465-70 
(2002) (discussing agency efforts to obtain public input prior to rule proposals). 
325
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.   
326
See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 14, at 970 (arguing in the context of a 
proposal to inject notice-and-comment procedures into judicial decisionmaking on the 
merits that “notice and comment might provide genuine constraint benefits even 
without an enforcement mechanism” because “reputation may be a more powerful 
motivator of judges than of administrative agency officials”). 
327
See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 278.   
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trative rulemaking process,328 others have found broad public partici-
pation in rulemakings.329  Furthermore, a recent study concluded that 
in the environmental context, public participation might help to im-
prove the performance of environmental agencies and their agenda-
setting decisions by collecting diffuse information about environmen-
tal conditions.330
3.  Certification 
  Hence, in the certiorari context, there is reason to 
hope that increased uninvited amici participation would represent di-
verse public views rather than just the views of certain special interests. 
A final way of broadening participation by knowledgeable outsiders 
in the Court’s certiorari process would be to reinvigorate “certifica-
tion.”  Congress has enabled certification by empowering the Court to 
hear cases from the courts of appeals via “certification at any time by a 
court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as 
to which instructions are desired.”331  Despite the Justices’ promises to 
rely upon certification when lobbying for the Judges’ Bill of 1925,332 
certification has “all but disappeared in recent decades.”333  Indeed, as 
Justice Stevens recently noted, “The Court has accepted only a handful 
of certified cases since the 1940s and none since 1981; it is a newswor-
thy event these days when a lower court even tries for certification.”334
Amanda Tyler recently gave certification some much-needed at-
tention, and her call for greater use of certification makes sense when 
thinking about different mechanisms that might be used in the certi-





See Biber & Brosi, supra note 
  If certification were used with 
greater regularity by the courts of appeals, it would enable more di-
alogue between the Court and courts of appeals judges who are well 
318, at 328 n.27 (noting that most scholars con-
clude that interest groups dominate the rulemaking process).   
329
See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 411, 460 (2005) (finding that comments from the lay public compose the vast 
majority of total comments on some regulations).   
330
See Biber & Brosi, supra note 318, at 377-84.   
331
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).   
332
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1710 (“In the hearings on the Judges’ Bill, it was 
repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, but 
that the courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control.”). 
333
United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting the deni-
al of the certified question). 
334
Id.; see also Nielson, supra note 160, at 486-88 (detailing the decline of the 
Court’s exercise of its certified question jurisdiction). 
335
See Tyler, supra note 11, at 1326-28 (advocating a return to the use of certifica-
tion).   
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situated to know what areas of the law need clarification.  Certifica-
tion, accordingly, stands as an underutilized tool that could be used 
with increasing frequency to achieve greater participation by know-
ledgeable outsiders during the certiorari process. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerned by the mix and number of cases the Court has been 
taking, scholars studying the Court have been quick to propose some 
fairly sweeping changes to certiorari.  Some of these reforms would 
take discretion away from the nine Justices on the Court and transfer 
certiorari decisions to some other body or division.  The recent Car-
rington and Cramton proposal, which calls for the creation of an en-
tirely new certiorari division consisting of federal judges, is just one 
such example.336
This Article suggests that before the certiorari power is taken away 
from the Court and placed elsewhere, some basic principles and doc-
trines found in administrative law should be consulted.  After all, the 
problem of confining discretion is not unique to judges, but rather is 
an issue that administrative law has thought long and hard about.  Al-
though certiorari involves a delegation to the Court rather than to an 
agency, the underlying concerns about accountability and reasoned 
decisionmaking remain the same.  In both contexts, congressional 
delegations of broad discretionary power raise concerns about a deli-
berative and democratically accountable branch transferring power to 
a less accountable body. 
 
When some of administrative law’s lessons about how to constrain 
delegated discretion are considered in the certiorari context, several 
means of reforming certiorari—while leaving the Court with substan-
tial discretion and flexibility—emerge.  Specifically, vote-disclosure 
requirements and increased public participation surface as promising 
means of increasing transparency, deliberation, and accountability in 
the certiorari process.  These potential reforms deserve serious con-




Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 591; see also Levinson, supra note 8, at 
110-11 (examining the idea of creating a “certiorari court”).   
